China and Pakistan have recently reached a significant agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban-led government has also expressed its willingness to join the project. This landmark decision was made during a trilateral meeting held in May in Beijing, attended by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. This development marks a major shift in the region’s strategic and economic landscape, with potential long-term implications for regional stability.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has long supported the idea of expanding CPEC into Afghanistan. However, several political and security challenges had previously hindered concrete progress. While earlier efforts remained largely symbolic, the current agreement suggests a shift in momentum. There now appears to be strong political will in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to integrate Afghanistan into the corridor. Notably, the Taliban leadership seems convinced of the strategic and economic necessity of joining the initiative.
From China’s perspective, incorporating Afghanistan into CPEC aligns with the broader vision of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a $900 billion interregional connectivity project designed to boost economic cooperation and trade across Asia and beyond. If CPEC is to serve as a critical artery of the BRI, then extending it into Afghanistan is not just logical—it is essential for maximizing its regional impact. CPEC itself is a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure initiative aimed at connecting China’s remote western region of Kashgar with Pakistan’s strategically located but underdeveloped Gwadar Port. Spanning over 2,000 kilometers, the corridor includes roads, railways, and a range of infrastructure and energy projects, with an estimated cost of $64 billion—primarily financed through Chinese loans. Chinese firms and experts are heavily involved in its implementation. Notable achievements already include the development of the Gwadar International Airport and the D.I. Khan–Islamabad Motorway, with numerous other strategic projects currently underway.
By bringing Afghanistan into the CPEC framework, China aims to deepen intra- and interregional economic ties, while also asserting a more active role in the region’s security and development agenda. China has already taken a proactive stance in Afghanistan’s peace process, beginning in 2014 when it facilitated Taliban delegations to hold talks in Beijing—a marked departure from its previously hands-off approach.
At present, one of China’s core foreign policy objectives is to expand trade and maintain its economic growth momentum. In contrast to Europe, the Americas, or other parts of Asia, major economic initiatives in South and Central Asia must be interregional by design, given the geopolitical realities. The region is among the most densely populated in the world, home to China and India—the first and second most populous nations—followed closely by Pakistan and Bangladesh. In this context, integrating Afghanistan into CPEC is not just about development; it is about shaping the future of regional connectivity and cooperation.
The regions of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East are not only geographically connected but also closely linked through deep-rooted economic and cultural ties. Against this backdrop, China and Pakistan’s decision to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan could significantly boost trade among the three nations. Moreover, it could pave the way for enhanced inter-regional movement of goods and people, linking markets across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
Beyond economic considerations, China’s interest in extending CPEC to Afghanistan is driven by strategic, security, and socio-political motivations. A primary goal for Beijing is to increase the interdependence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, thereby fostering improved bilateral relations. The idea is that greater economic integration could discourage both sides from supporting instability in each other’s territory. While economic interdependence can often promote peace and cooperation, its success is not guaranteed—especially given the fragile and mistrust-laden state of current Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
Another significant objective for China is the development of its remote northwestern region, particularly the Xinjiang province, which is home to a large Muslim Uyghur population. Through CPEC, China hopes to accelerate development in Xinjiang, thereby weakening separatist movements like the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Integrating Afghanistan into CPEC could help stabilize the border areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which in the past have served as sanctuaries for such militant groups. China believes that with improved infrastructure and development, these areas will become less hospitable to extremists.
While Pakistan publicly supports regional connectivity and does not oppose Afghanistan’s inclusion in CPEC, it has shown limited enthusiasm for rapid expansion. Understandably, Islamabad is keen to maximize its own benefits from the corridor and may be reluctant to share its strategic and economic gains with neighboring countries—especially if doing so dilutes Pakistan’s own leverage in the project.
On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban leadership is eager to join CPEC, recognizing the potential economic benefits. However, strong anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan’s security establishment and broader public opinion could pose significant obstacles. Additionally, India’s deep-rooted influence in Afghan official circles has historically discouraged Kabul from aligning with CPEC, a project spearheaded by two of India’s main regional rivals—Pakistan and China. India is particularly concerned about the growing Chinese presence in Gwadar and the strategic implications it poses. Therefore, for Afghanistan to fully embrace CPEC, the Taliban-led government would need to neutralize this Indian influence.
Another important player, the United States, may support Afghanistan’s integration into broader regional trade frameworks. However, Washington views CPEC—and the wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—as a vehicle for expanding Chinese influence, which runs counter to U.S. strategic interests in the region. While the U.S. may back regional development in principle, it is unlikely to support projects that elevate China’s geopolitical standing.
In conclusion, while there is strong political will and strategic logic behind integrating Afghanistan into CPEC, the path forward is complex. Deep mistrust persists—between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and between the China-Pakistan alliance and India. For Afghanistan’s inclusion in CPEC to become a reality, all stakeholders must engage in sincere dialogue and cooperation, with an emphasis on long-term regional stability over short-term geopolitical gains.