Pakistan has once again unequivocally declared that it will hold no talks with the outlawed, Afghanistan-based Pakistani terrorist group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as advised by the Afghan Taliban regime. This firm declaration came after the second round of talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, held in late October in Istanbul, Turkey. During the meeting, both sides reaffirmed the earlier ceasefire commitment made in the first round of negotiations in Qatar, also in October, and agreed to continue dialogue.
The week-long clashes between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime in mid-October had prompted the Istanbul engagement. The fighting erupted when Pakistan launched air and missile strikes on TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan, and Kabul retaliated with heavy attacks on Pakistani border posts. The clashes resulted in the deaths of at least 200 Taliban and TTP fighters and the martyrdom of around 25 Pakistani security personnel. Since then, a tense ceasefire has held and both sides continue to hold talks.
Pakistan’s clarity and firmness in talks with the Afghan Taliban regime are entirely logical. Islamabad’s demand is straightforward and justified: an end to terrorism in Pakistan originating from Afghan soil. During the talks, the Afghan delegation did not deny the presence of TTP elements in Afghanistan. In fact, Afghan representatives openly acknowledged that the TTP was operating within their territory but, paradoxically, argued that the group’s activities were an “internal matter” of Pakistan — and that the Taliban regime would not take action against them.
This reasoning is fundamentally flawed. How can Pakistan effectively address the threat of the TTP when the group’s command and control structure operates entirely from Afghanistan? The only scenario in which Pakistan could manage the threat internally would be if the TTP were based within its borders. However, for over a decade, the group has been operating from Afghanistan. For instance, former TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan, not Pakistan. Similarly, the current leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, is also believed to be hiding in Afghanistan — though reports of his death in recent Pakistani airstrikes remain unconfirmed.
The Afghan Taliban’s argument that Pakistan should deal with the TTP independently makes little sense when the group is based and sheltered in Afghanistan. Moreover, the TTP—known as Fitna al-Khawarij—is not merely operating from Afghan territory but doing so with Kabul’s full patronage.
At present, Pakistan’s policy toward the Afghan Taliban appears clear and consistent: while Islamabad continues to pursue peaceful engagement with Kabul, it maintains that “there can be no compromise on our security and sovereignty.” This declaration is both logical and necessary, for no sovereign state can compromise its security or territorial integrity. At the same time, Pakistan keeps the door open for dialogue with the Taliban regime since, regardless of differences, they control an entire neighboring country that holds strategic importance for Pakistan.
The TTP, on the other hand, does not recognize Pakistan’s statehood or sovereignty, despite using the term “Pakistan” in its name. The group openly rejects the country’s constitution, laws, and governance system. What makes the Afghan Taliban’s support for such an organization deeply troubling is that Pakistan was once their strongest ally — the country that stood by them when the entire world opposed their rule and even provided refuge to members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda during their years of isolation.
While the TTP consists largely of Pakistani nationals, it acts as a proxy for the Afghan Taliban. Its members are rebels against their own country and enemies of its people. Their ideological rigidity and narrow worldview make them incapable of reform or reconciliation. They are driven not by reason but by fanaticism — a threat to Pakistan’s security and to millions of innocent lives.
Given this background, any new dialogue with the TTP — even hypothetically — would be futile and self-defeating. The government’s categorical refusal to reopen talks with the group is therefore entirely rational. Negotiating with an organization that denies the legitimacy of the state itself serves no purpose. The last attempt at peace talks in 2021 stands as a cautionary tale: the TTP exploited Pakistan’s leniency to regroup and strengthen its network after returning from Afghan sanctuaries.
At the time, Prime Minister Imran Khan and Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa had believed that engagement might soften the group’s stance or split moderates from hardliners — an understandable but ultimately misplaced strategy. The TTP used the talks not for peace, but to prepare for renewed violence. Hence, any future attempt to engage them would again only embolden their terrorism.
In this context, the recent calls by Imran Khan’s party, which governs the terrorism-hit province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), to resume negotiations with the TTP are dangerously misguided. The province has suffered most from TTP violence — with countless lives lost, livelihoods destroyed, and millions displaced. Such proposals show a grave misunderstanding of the group’s nature and motives.
There must be complete clarity and unity among Pakistan’s state institutions, as well as between the federal and provincial governments, on policy toward Afghanistan and the TTP. Unfortunately, there currently exists a policy divide between Islamabad and the KP government — a division that only weakens Pakistan’s position. This lack of cohesion is deeply concerning for a nation already exhausted by terrorism and its devastating social, economic, and psychological consequences.