Recently, Pakistani strategists have asserted that the largest terrorist network targeting Pakistan, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), based in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Taliban are essentially one entity, with no real distinction between the two militant groups. At first glance, this may seem surprising since they operate in two separate countries, yet there is significant rationale behind this conclusion drawn by Pakistani decision-makers.
The premise of Pakistani strategists for arguing that the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), which the state refers to as Fitna-ul-Khawaij, constitute a single entity rests on the rising involvement of Afghans within the TTP and the subsequent blurring of boundaries between the two groups. According to these strategists, in the recent anti-terrorist operations, nearly 60 percent of terrorists killed during infiltration attempts over the past three to four months were Afghan nationals.
The head of Pakistan’s military public relations wing, Lt. General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, has stated, “The TTP is not a separate entity; it is a branch of the Afghan Taliban.” He elaborated that the group has pledged allegiance to the Taliban emir, adding that “we have clear evidence that the Taliban are settling TTP fighters in densely populated areas to provide them a protective shield.”
It must be recalled that the TTP has historically viewed the Afghan Taliban model as its ideological ideal. The Afghan Taliban insurgency, which began in 1994 and resulted in their takeover of Afghanistan in 1996 and again in 2021 through insurgency tactics, suicide attacks, and seizure of state authority, has long served as a blueprint for the TTP. It should also be remembered that the formation of the TTP in 2007 was fashioned after the Afghan Taliban by its founder, Baitullah Mehsud.
Thus, when the TTP was established, its founder Baitullah Mehsud took bayat (pledge of allegiance) to Afghan Taliban founder Maulvi Omar Mujahid. Consequently, despite being composed of Pakistani militants, the TTP has often shown greater loyalty to the Afghan Taliban than to Pakistan. In effect, the TTP has remained an extension of the Afghan Taliban throughout its existence. Seeing that the group no longer has space within Pakistan—particularly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa—the TTP has further solidified its ties with the Afghan Taliban, much to the frustration of Pakistani authorities.
From the TTP’s perspective, replicating the Afghan Taliban’s insurgency-plus-terrorism model holds more promise for success than negotiating with the Pakistani state or acquiring a marginal territory along the border to operate as local warlords. Moreover, the TTP has broader ideological objectives attainable only through violence and terrorism. While the TTP may have its own reasons for fighting Pakistan, the more important question is why the Afghan Taliban have remained completely uncompromising on their support for the TTP despite Islamabad’s pressure and diplomatic engagement.
There are several critical reasons in Afghan Taliban calculations that explain why continued—and even increased—support for the TTP serves their interests more than strengthening ties with Pakistan, their long-time benefactor.
The Afghan Taliban view the TTP as a valuable strategic asset. During the Afghan Taliban insurgency against the U.S.-backed Afghan state, the TTP not only reinforced their ranks but also fought against Afghan forces and international troops, including NATO, helping secure Taliban victories on the battlefield, especially when U.S.-aligned forces adopted a more neutral posture. For these reasons, the Afghan Taliban consider themselves indebted to the TTP.
More importantly, in the Afghan Taliban’s calculations, the TTP could play an instrumental role in countering future resistance from anti-Taliban Afghan groups, mostly comprising non-Pashtun minorities such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmen—communities that had formed the Northern Alliance in 2001 to aid the U.S.-NATO offensive that ousted the Taliban regime after 9/11.
Thus, the shared Pashtun ethnicity of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is a major factor behind the Afghan Taliban’s unwavering support and reliance on the TTP. Beyond the strategic and ideological considerations previously mentioned, this shared ethnic identity has become the most significant factor compelling Pakistan to rethink its longstanding pro-Taliban policy in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has increasingly realized that its extensive support for the Afghan Taliban has backfired and now constitutes a serious threat to national security. Since regaining power, the Afghan Taliban regime has adopted an overtly hostile posture toward Pakistan, manifested not only in rhetoric but also in concrete actions.
Recent border skirmishes between Islamabad and Kabul highlight this shift. Notably, the Afghan Taliban regime attacked Pakistani border forces after Islamabad targeted TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan. Such strong reactions reinforce Pakistan’s assertion that the TTP and the Afghan Taliban are one and the same.
The Afghan Taliban’s adoption of a nationalistic, anti-Pakistan posture appears to be a deliberate strategy aimed at winning public support within Afghanistan. Coming to power by force, and lacking deep roots in Afghan society and history, the Taliban regime seeks to bolster its legitimacy by cultivating anti-Pakistan sentiments—an approach likely to resonate with segments of the Afghan population.
This narrative serves to attract both sentimental and educated Pashtuns, for whom anti-Pakistan rhetoric has long held emotional appeal. Therefore, by promoting anti-Pakistan sentiments, the Afghan Taliban aim to strengthen their hold on power and increase acceptance among Afghan citizens.
This strategy, however, is ultimately shortsighted. Pakistani strategists maintain—with substantial evidence—that the Afghan Taliban are hosting the TTP, despite repeatedly claiming they would not allow Afghan soil to be used against Pakistan. These assurances, however, remain little more than lip service. As long as the Afghan Taliban regime remains in power in Afghanistan, it is likely to continue supporting and cultivating the TTP.