A warning that the Indus River has shifted nearly 4.5 kilometres east of Larkana over the past 35 years and is now threatening a critical section of the flood protection dyke should be enough to trigger immediate government action. Satellite analysis by SUPARCO has documented sustained channel migration and bank erosion around the Aqil and Moria loop bunds, with approximately 2,000 hectares of land already lost to erosion along the left bank.
The river has gradually consumed much of the safety margin that once separated its active channel from vital flood protection infrastructure. Yet, once again, evidence of a potentially devastating disaster appears to be moving faster than the machinery responsible for preventing it.
There is little justification for official surprise. Scientists, water experts, investigators and the media have repeatedly warned about the consequences of encroachment, unplanned construction and interference with natural waterways. The Supreme Court’s Flood Commission examined many of these issues after the catastrophic floods of 2010, when the breach of the Tori Bund contributed to widespread devastation in Sindh.
The lessons from that disaster should have been obvious. Settlements and fish ponds had emerged within protected areas, natural flood channels had been obstructed and vulnerable communities were ultimately left to bear the consequences. Homes were destroyed, livelihoods disappeared and thousands of families were displaced. Sixteen years later, the underlying governance failures remain disturbingly familiar.
Riverine land continues to be occupied, floodplains continue to be developed and construction continues without sufficient consideration of hydrology or long-term flood risk. Around Hyderabad, areas that once served as natural riparian buffers have increasingly been converted into permanent housing and roads. Such development reduces the space available for floodwater to spread naturally and can increase pressure on embankments and nearby settlements when the Indus rises.
The findings from Larkana make the situation even more urgent. Satellite imagery has demonstrated that decades of erosion and sediment deposition have gradually pushed the active river channel towards the flood defences. Continued erosion can undermine an embankment long before floodwater actually overtops it. If a weakened section fails during a period of high flows, communities on the other side could have dangerously little time to respond or evacuate. This is not a hypothetical threat buried in a technical planning document. It is a measurable physical process recorded through decades of satellite observations.
The obvious question is: where is the corresponding urgency from the government? Pakistan has developed an unfortunate pattern of responding more vigorously to disasters after they occur than to the evidence of danger before they strike. Commissions are formed, investigations are conducted, reports are prepared and recommendations are issued. But once the immediate crisis fades, responsibility often becomes dispersed among departments and implementation loses momentum.
The problem becomes even more difficult when encroachments involve influential or politically connected interests. Weak enforcement, poor urban planning and corruption can turn natural hazards into entirely preventable human disasters. The financial cost alone should be sufficient to prompt immediate action. A major failure of flood protection could expose billions of rupees worth of homes, agricultural land, roads, public infrastructure and economic activity. Reconstruction would then consume scarce public resources and potentially require years of rehabilitation and external assistance.
The human cost would be far greater. Families could lose their homes, crops and businesses. Communities could be displaced. Children’s education could be interrupted and local economies could take years to recover. Most tragically, lives could be lost because authorities failed to respond to risks that had been identified well before floodwaters arrived.
The Sindh government must therefore treat the SUPARCO findings as an urgent planning and disaster-prevention document rather than another report to be filed away. The vulnerable sections of the bund should undergo immediate technical assessment, with reinforcement or other protective measures undertaken wherever necessary.
At the same time, encroachments that obstruct natural flood flows need to be identified and removed in accordance with the law. Construction and permanent settlement in high-risk floodplains must be brought under effective control. Land-use planning should take actual river behaviour into account rather than treating floodplains as ordinary development land. The government should also make its response transparent. It should publicly release the relevant findings, identify the vulnerable locations, announce a clear action plan and provide timelines for remedial measures. Regular progress reports would help ensure that responsibility remains visible and cannot once again disappear into departmental files.
This is precisely the kind of situation in which prevention is both possible and considerably cheaper than recovery. The investigators have investigated. The scientists have analysed. The satellites have documented the river’s movement. The experts have warned. And the river itself is providing unmistakable evidence of where its channel is heading.
The authorities therefore have something Pakistan rarely possesses in the face of a major disaster: advance warning supported by scientific evidence and enough time to act. They must use it. Waiting for the Indus to provide the final warning in the form of a breached embankment and flooded communities would not be an unfortunate accident. It would represent a failure to act on a danger that was clearly visible in advance.