The deadly September 19 terrorist attack on a mosque near Old Police Lines in Kohat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), which claimed the lives of at least 35 people, mostly police officials, must raise alarm across the country, particularly in KP, as more such attacks are likely to be carried out in the province by terrorist groups.
According to media reports, the attackers drove a vehicle packed with explosives towards a mosque in the Old Police Lines complex in Kohat during Friday prayers. The explosion caused extensive damage to the mosque building and the multi-purpose complex that houses the district’s police headquarters and key departments, including the Counter Terrorism Department and Special Branch.
Notably, this was a major terrorist attack targeting police officials and civilians after a relatively long period. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)-linked Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), led by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement. Here, it is also important to note that the apparent purpose of the attack was to inflict the heaviest possible damage on the police in the district and across KP.
The KP police have, for more than two decades, been playing the role of the first line of defence against terrorist groups, particularly the TTP, and have borne the heaviest brunt in this struggle. In recent years, the role of the KP police has become even more pronounced in confronting terrorism. In particular, in the southern districts of KP, police officials have gone to every extent to fight terrorists, and the bravery of countless police officials has been instrumental in preventing militants from regaining control of many areas and districts. Their sacrifices and courage will remain an important part of the province’s history.
There appears to have been a serious lapse in planning by senior police officials in failing to relocate the offices of the police administration, Special Branch and Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) from a location that was highly vulnerable to attack. The site was not far from the restive Hangu district and, further beyond, the Kurram district bordering Afghanistan. The police lines in Kohat are located on the Kohat-Hangu Road and were therefore relatively exposed to militant attacks.
The terrorists took maximum advantage of this vulnerability and inflicted heavy casualties on the police. This does not necessarily mean that the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group and other militant organisations have been unable to stage high-level attacks. Rather, it indicates that a significant vulnerability remained on the part of the police leadership, leaving a large number of police officials concentrated at a location that could be targeted by terrorists.
Moreover, the fact that terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam carried out a deadly attack on a mosque, killing not only police officials but also civilians who had nothing to do with their agenda, demonstrates the extent to which such groups disregard the very religious values they claim to defend. It is also an indication of the pressure and frustration under which terrorist groups may now be operating. For the resilience and resistance shown by the KP police, credit must go to the force and its personnel who have continued to confront terrorism despite enormous risks.
Coming to the claim of responsibility for the Kohat terrorist attack by the Gul Bahadur-led IMP, the alliance also includes Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP) and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), the group associated with the late Mangal Bagh in Khyber district of KP. Although the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG) and its alliance with HIIP and LeI are not widely known to the general public, and even to some analysts who usually attribute terrorist attacks primarily to the TTP, the reality is that Pakistan faces a wider militant landscape involving several organisations.
The HGBG and the IMP under its influence are serious militant groups and, at times, their attacks have reportedly involved sophisticated planning. This is partly linked to the background of Gul Bahadur, a veteran militant commander whose organisation relocated much of its command and control structure to Afghanistan in 2015 following Pakistan’s major security operations after the December 16, 2014 school attack in Peshawar, in which around 150 students and staff members were killed.
Since then, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and many members of his group have remained based in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban have condemned the Kohat terrorist attack, saying that any attack on a place of worship is unacceptable. However, the Taliban’s response has also been criticised because of its failure to directly condemn the IMP or Gul Bahadur, whose group claimed responsibility for the attack. This creates questions about the consistency of Kabul’s stated position against terrorism emanating from Afghan soil.
It is important to note that the HGBG, as mentioned above, is a separate Pakistani militant group from the TTP and is based in Afghanistan. The group has increasingly turned against Pakistan, contributing to the growing threat of terrorist attacks inside the country. The Kohat attack, in which dozens of police officials, including a Superintendent of Police (SP)-rank officer, along with several civilians were martyred, underlines the seriousness of this threat.
The turning of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group against Pakistan while operating from Afghanistan represents a major setback for Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy of the last two decades. That policy at different stages relied on relationships with militant groups, including Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s network, which was once regarded in some policy circles as part of the so-called “good Taliban” landscape. Such groups were seen as useful in supporting the Afghan Taliban in their fight against Afghan government forces between 2002 and 2021 and against the US-led NATO presence in Afghanistan.
While such policies may have achieved certain short-term strategic objectives, the subsequent emergence of former allies or tolerated groups as direct security threats to Pakistan demonstrates the potential for serious blowback. The transformation of the Gul Bahadur Group from a group once viewed differently by sections of Pakistan’s security establishment into an organisation carrying out or supporting attacks against Pakistan represents a major challenge for Islamabad. The situation has become so serious that Pakistan has carried out air strikes inside Afghanistan targeting alleged hideouts of the TTP and HGBG.
The HGBG mainly originates from North Waziristan, the former tribal district of KP located directly along the Afghan border. The group once exercised substantial influence in the area and maintained what was effectively a militant stronghold. However, after Pakistan’s military operations in the region following 2015, the state effectively reclaimed North Waziristan and other tribal districts from the militants, and the writ of the state was significantly restored.
After the Afghan Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, however, the HGBG has made a strong comeback from its bases across the border. Therefore, while counterterrorism operations and other security measures are continuing, a key determinant of the success of military and counterterrorism efforts against HGBG and similar groups in North Waziristan will be how effectively the government maintains its physical control over the district.
Sustained physical control of territory is necessary for creating the conditions required to defeat terrorist and insurgent organisations. Once government forces establish and maintain a permanent presence across an area, militants face far greater difficulties in reclaiming territory. With regular forces physically manning the territory, it becomes extremely difficult for terrorist groups to regain areas they once controlled for years.
The Kohat terrorist attack is therefore deeply unfortunate, but it also reflects the harsh reality that even after the state has reclaimed territory from militant groups, terrorist organisations can continue to stage deadly attacks. Counterterrorism cannot be treated as a one-time operation. It requires sustained intelligence, policing, border management, physical control of vulnerable areas and constant adaptation to changing militant tactics. For KP in particular, the challenge is likely to remain formidable, and the Kohat attack should serve as a warning that the fight against terrorism is far from over.