Relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime continue to deteriorate as Kabul-supported Pakistani terrorist outfits, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG), keep carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces. Meanwhile, an interim Afghan Taliban minister has vowed to capture Peshawar within two days if his regime desires.

Following the recent Kohat terrorist attack that claimed nearly 40 lives—claimed by the Afghanistan-based, Taliban-protected HGBG—and other assaults by the TTP, Pakistan carried out precision airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Helmand provinces on October 1. Pakistan’s Ministry of Information maintained that the operation was a meticulously planned, intelligence-based counterterrorism action targeting TTP hideouts, which eliminated 22 militants and destroyed weapons caches. Conversely, the Afghan government claimed the strikes hit civilian residences, killing nine people—mostly women and children—and injuring 11 others.

Pakistan’s official stance regarding these strikes is that the Afghan Taliban government actively harbors the TTP and HGBG, allowing militant groups to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistani territory. For their part, the Afghan Taliban deny these allegations, maintaining that security issues within Pakistan remain an internal matter while condemning the airstrikes as a blatant violation of Afghan sovereignty. While civilian casualties in such aerial operations cannot be entirely ruled out due to terrorists using civilians as human shields, Afghan Taliban claims that Pakistan’s airstrikes exclusively targeted civilians make no sense at all. Why would Pakistan deliberately strike innocent civilians who are not only from a neighboring state but are fellow Muslims? However, striking the hideouts of Pakistani terrorists based in Afghanistan is fully justified, both legally and morally, because they represent a persistent fitna that ought to be eliminated.

Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban regime’s argument that Pakistan’s security troubles are purely an internal issue for Islamabad lacks justification given the regional reality. As if this friction were not enough, Taliban Minister for Borders and Tribal Affairs, Noorullah Noori, stated that the Afghan flag could be raised in Peshawar—the capital of Pakistan’s KP province—within two days if the Islamic Emirate (the term the regime uses for itself) chose to act. Addressing a gathering in Kabul, Noori cautioned Pakistan against testing Afghanistan’s patience. While the minister’s statement regarding the capture of Peshawar is largely a shallow threat meant to appease domestic Afghan nationalist sentiments, it also reveals the deep-seated internal wish of many Afghans. Kabul has long harbored irredentist claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun-inhabited territories in KP and upper Balochistan without any legal or moral foundation.

In this context, there is little expectation of improving relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime. In fact, no such hope is realistic when the Afghan Taliban consistently maintain the stance that Kabul cannot stop attacks by Afghanistan-based Pakistani terrorist groups inside Pakistan. In recent years, the Taliban regime’s support for Pakistan’s largest terrorist network, the TTP, has become the primary bone of contention between the two sides. While the Afghan Taliban deny offering direct support to the Pakistani Taliban despite acknowledging their presence in Afghanistan, they have failed to take any concrete measures to prevent the TTP from executing strikes inside Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the prospects of mending these sour relations appear exceedingly difficult.

On the other hand, Islamabad has unequivocally stated that Kabul must choose between maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan or continuing to host and protect the Pakistani Taliban at the expense of its relationship with Islamabad. In short, Pakistan is asking Kabul to choose between the Pakistani state or the militant TTP. The Pakistani Taliban have been waging war against the Pakistani state since their formation in 2007. However, after the launching of a grand military operation against the group following the loathsome school attack in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, most of the TTP’s leadership and network relocated across the border. There, the TTP provided crucial support to the Afghan Taliban fighting against the now-defunct Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and US-led international forces. Thus, TTP fighters became strategic assets for the Afghan Taliban, making it nearly impossible for Kabul to abandon them. This explains why, even after five years, the Afghan Taliban regime remains hesitant to take action against the TTP, claiming instead that it cannot stop the group from carrying out attacks on Pakistani soil.

Recent months have witnessed another sharp spike in terrorist attacks by the TTP and HGBG across KP province, claiming hundreds of Pakistani lives. Most of these incidents have been claimed by or blamed upon the TTP. Pakistan blames the Taliban regime in Kabul for this recent surge in terrorism and urges them to stop cross-border attacks and prohibit the use of Afghan soil against Pakistan.

It appears that with Pakistan’s firm and fully justified stance, relations with the Afghan Taliban regime have hit a historic low. Pakistan has now clarified in no uncertain terms that Afghan authorities are well aware of the TTP’s hideouts and sanctuaries on Afghan soil; failing to act against them is a deliberate policy choice. Realizing this, Pakistan has recognized that enough is enough, and a line must be drawn where state interest takes precedence over appeasement. The TTP has been the primary enemy of the state for the last 19 years, and any country that supports it cannot be considered a friend—if not explicitly labeled an enemy of Pakistan.

For their part, the Afghan Taliban have hosted and nurtured the TTP on Afghan soil out of self-interest. As mentioned earlier, the TTP assisted the Afghan Taliban in fighting Afghan state forces, rival militant groups, and international forces inside Afghanistan. Therefore, the Pakistani Taliban hold immense strategic value for Kabul, which is why the regime remains unwilling to compromise on them. Ironically, the Pakistani state was historically supportive of the Afghan Taliban and played a key role during their overrunning of Afghan state forces to recapture power. Pakistan had banked on the Afghan Taliban to secure a friendly regime in Kabul. Yet, since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan has been unable to realize its long-cherished hope that a Taliban return to power would eliminate the animosity emanating from Afghanistan toward Islamabad. This outcome has been deeply unfortunate for Pakistan.

This situation offers a crucial lesson: Pakistan’s policy regarding Afghanistan—specifically relying on the Taliban to fulfill its strategic objectives—has failed. Consequently, a thorough reassessment is required to formulate a viable policy moving forward. Pakistan’s hope that the Afghan Taliban would help address security threats along its western border has come to naught. The underlying reason is that pinning hopes on a militant non-state actor is fundamentally flawed; a militantly-oriented group, no matter how friendly it may initially appear, retains the potential to turn against its benefactor.

Furthermore, since the Afghan Taliban’s second coming to power, the militia has adopted a stronger blend of nationalist and religious fervor. Their regime’s support for the TTP is also driven by historical Afghan irredentist claims over Pakistani Pashtun-dominated territories. Lacking political legitimacy inside Afghanistan as a military faction that seized power by force rather than through a democratic process, the Taliban critically need to rally public support. Because anti-Pakistan sentiments have historically run deep in Afghanistan, the Taliban—much like previous Afghan rulers, whether elected or unelected—have tried to stoke anti-Pakistan feelings to unite the population behind them and legitimize their rule. The Afghan Taliban’s adoption of this posture has ultimately forced Pakistan to revisit its Afghanistan policy. This is indeed the right step to take. In fact, it should have been taken much earlier; nevertheless, it is better late than never.