In recent times, particularly during the current year, Pakistan has faced massive terrorist attacks across two of its key provinces as well as the federal capital, Islamabad, compelling the country’s strategists to revisit and rethink existing counterterrorism strategies.
Terrorist groups, particularly those designated by the state as Fitna-ul-Khawarij or the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), along with Baloch separatist insurgent groups labelled as Fitna-tul-Hindustan (India-created rebels), have been wreaking havoc in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan respectively, claiming the lives of hundreds of civilians and security forces personnel. As a result, the country’s strategists—whether from the political arena or the military—have quite rightly identified the urgent need to implement the National Action Plan (NAP) in both letter and spirit. There is no doubt that the NAP, as a national policy to counter violent extremism and terrorism, remains the most comprehensively formulated document. Without implementing its 20 points in totality, no real or meaningful progress in eliminating the twin menaces of extremism and terrorism can be achieved. However, the most important question remains: how should its 20 points be implemented in practice?
It must be recalled that the NAP was framed unanimously by the entire political leadership of Pakistan in the aftermath of the heinous Army Public School terrorist attack in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, with the objective of decisively countering extremism and terrorism in the country.
As far as two significant points of the NAP—namely the execution of convicted terrorists and the formation of speedy courts to try those accused of terrorism—are concerned, there has been some encouraging implementation in the past, but it has not proved sufficient. Another key point of the NAP, which calls for ensuring that no armed militia can function in the country, requires a holistic and integrated policy, as mere declarations are not enough. Such a policy must combine the outlawing of militias, effective legal action against them, and the use of robust military and police force to physically and forcefully prevent their operations. Moreover, the overall strategy must blend physical, psychological, and economic measures to dismantle armed militias. Strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), as envisaged under the NAP, can be achieved by inducting and consulting subject experts and credible analysts with strong backgrounds in terrorism and security studies.
The fifth point of the NAP, which deals with countering hate speech and extremist material, has suffered from weak and inconsistent implementation and has lacked the boldness required from the government. The state must ruthlessly and indiscriminately enforce the existing ban on the use of loudspeakers installed in mosques for any purpose other than the call to prayer (Azan). Furthermore, the government must crack down on all printed, broadcast, and online material, including internet sites, through which extremists and terrorists spread propaganda and secure recruits, finances, and sympathizers. The NAP also calls for choking the financial resources of terrorists. In this regard, government agencies must identify the vast business networks and commercial complexes established by extremist and terrorist groups, which serve as their primary sources of funding. Although authorities possess substantial data on this issue, action to forfeit such assets has remained negligible. While some concrete steps have been taken to curb illegal Hundi and Hawala money transfer systems, many networks involved in these transactions continue to operate with impunity, a matter that requires serious and immediate attention.
Another point of the NAP calls for ensuring that proscribed organizations do not re-emerge. This, again, is fundamentally a question of the government’s commitment to its stated counterterrorism objectives. Otherwise, it is well known how banned organizations resurface under new names and altered identities.
The ninth point of the NAP, which focuses on taking effective steps against religious persecution, could be implemented by banning all sources of unofficial fatwas (religious edicts) and revamping the existing government-funded system of district and provincial muftis and khateebs.
Arguably, one of the most critical points of the NAP relates to the registration and regulation of madrassas. Given their physical presence, their historical linkage with religious extremism, and, above all, the occurrence of the unspeakably horrific Peshawar school massacre in 2014, regulating and registering madrassas should have been relatively straightforward. However, successive governments—the PML-N, followed by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), and the current ruling coalition of PML-N, PPP, MQM and others in power since April 2022—have failed to fully capitalize on this opportunity. Even now, the way forward lies in regulating madrassa affairs without fear of political backlash or public pressure.
The NAP point regarding administrative and development reforms in the erstwhile FATA, now merged tribal districts (MTDs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with particular emphasis on the return and rehabilitation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), carries immense significance. Although FATA has been merged with KP, the move has paradoxically generated new conflicts and grievances. This situation requires urgent and serious review; otherwise, continued instability in the former tribal areas will keep feeding extremism and terrorism across Pakistan. If the merger framework is not delivering desired outcomes, alternative arrangements—including the option of de-merging the MTDs—may need to be thoughtfully considered.
The NAP also calls for tangible measures against the abuse of the internet and social media for terrorist purposes. This is entirely feasible but has not been implemented with consistency and resolve. The pertinent question is: if the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) can effectively block YouTube and thousands of pornographic websites, why can it not block platforms used by extremists and terrorists?
The 15th point of the NAP, which emphasizes zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab, is of fundamental importance. For much of the past few decades, Punjab has been governed by the PML-N, yet the threat posed by extremist and terrorist outfits could not be decisively neutralized due to an evident lack of political will. This issue must be addressed immediately by the powers that be.
The NAP provision regarding taking the Karachi operation to its logical conclusion has been implemented to a considerable extent, which is indeed commendable. However, sustained vigilance is required to ensure that militant wings within political parties such as the PPP, Jamaat-e-Islami, ANP, and MQM—each of which has had militant or armed factions in the past—do not re-emerge.
The 18th point, which calls for firm action against sectarian terrorists, could have been relatively easier to implement if all mosques and Imambargahs owned or controlled by sectarian organizations had been placed under direct government supervision. This remains the most viable way forward.
Finally, the NAP provision concerning the formulation of a comprehensive policy to address the issue of Afghan refugees has seen some progress, but much more remains to be done. Since July this year, no Afghan national residing in Pakistan without a valid visa has any legal standing; therefore, such individuals must be repatriated without further delay in accordance with the law.