The Afghan Taliban’s increasingly hostile stance toward Pakistan since their return to power in August 2021 has reached a critical point, compelling Islamabad to reassess its Afghan policy comprehensively. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been openly supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), officially referred to as Fitna-Tul-Khawarij by Pakistan. This support has emboldened the TTP to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks within Pakistan, resulting in the loss of hundreds of security personnel and civilians.

In recent months, TTP-led terrorist activities have surged, primarily affecting the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, particularly the merged tribal districts (formerly FATA). The districts of North and South Waziristan, along with Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, have borne the brunt of these attacks. North and South Waziristan lie on the Afghan border, while Tank and D.I. Khan are located nearby. Meanwhile, the Khyber tribal district, adjacent to Peshawar and bordering Afghanistan, has also seen significant violence. Notably, the Tirah Valley in Khyber district, a once-picturesque region, has become a no-go area. Security forces have called for the temporary evacuation of parts of Tirah Valley to conduct clearance operations.

The deteriorating security situation has disrupted civil administration. Courts in North and South Waziristan, as well as Tank, have ceased operations and relocated to relatively safer areas like D.I. Khan, the hometown of KP Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur. While the Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court has recently ordered the resumption of court operations in these districts, such a move poses significant risks to judges, court staff, and litigants due to the prevailing instability.

The current situation in KP, especially the tribal districts, is alarmingly reminiscent of the 2009–2014 period when the TTP controlled vast swathes of territory, operating with impunity. Although its dominance today is primarily nocturnal, the trajectory suggests a potential return to complete control if left unchecked. Such a scenario would be catastrophic for Pakistan and must be avoided at all costs.

Addressing this growing threat requires a monumental effort from Pakistan’s security forces, who are already engaged in combating the TTP. The root cause of this crisis, however, lies in the unwavering support extended by the Afghan Taliban to the TTP, exacerbating Pakistan’s internal security challenges.

The primary reason behind the Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP lies in their deep-seated anti-Pakistan sentiments and long-term strategy toward Islamabad. Fundamentally, the Afghan Taliban remains a terrorist group and, at best, a militia that has seized state power. Its approach to foreign relations is neither measured nor indicative of a mature state actor. Instead, it is driven by emotions and impractical ambitions rather than rationality or Afghanistan’s national interest. Ironically, their use of the TTP against Pakistan might, in their eyes, align with what they perceive as Afghanistan’s national interest.

For Pakistan’s strategists, it is imperative to acknowledge that nearly four decades of unwavering support for the Afghan Taliban have ultimately yielded no positive outcomes. From the Taliban’s emergence in 1994 to their initial rise to power in 1996, their brutal regime that harbored groups like Al-Qaeda, and their subsequent ouster by the US-led coalition post-9/11, Pakistan was the only consistent ally backing the Taliban. Even during the insurgency from 2001 to 2021 and the eventual second takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Pakistan played a critical role in ensuring the Taliban’s survival and resurgence.

However, since regaining power on August 15, 2021, the Afghan Taliban’s actions have been openly hostile toward Pakistan. Their support for the TTP, refusal to recognize the international border (Durand Line), and dismissive labeling of it as an “imaginary line” underscore this antagonism. Credit must be given to Pakistan’s security forces, particularly former Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa, for implementing the barbed wire fencing along the border. Despite his political controversies, this fence has been a vital measure in mitigating cross-border terrorist incursions. Without it, the scale and frequency of TTP-led attacks from Afghan soil would have been far worse.

The air strikes conducted by Pakistan on December 21 in Afghanistan’s Barmal district, Paktika province—adjacent to North Waziristan—are a step in the right direction. These strikes eliminated over 40 TTP terrorists. While reports of collateral damage, including women and children, are unfortunate, they highlight the challenges of targeting militants who deliberately use human shields across borders.

However, air strikes alone are insufficient. Pakistan must urgently and fundamentally overhaul its Afghanistan policy. It is time to admit that supporting the Afghan Taliban has been a monumental miscalculation. A militia or terrorist group cannot transform into a credible state actor, nor can it be expected to act in Pakistan’s favor. Islamabad’s future approach must be pragmatic, grounded in national security priorities, and free from the flawed assumptions of the past.