Despite repeated claims by the Afghan Taliban rulers that they are stabilising Afghanistan and placing the country on a path of development, independent observers largely agree that the unelected Taliban regime is instead pushing the country into a deep ditch of conflict, instability and violence.
Since their forceful takeover of state power in August 2021 for the second time, the Afghan Taliban have ruled primarily through the use of arms rather than consent. Although, initially, the Taliban did not govern as ruthlessly or draconically as during their first stint in power, they are gradually reverting to their old, coercive and violent modes of rule. Moreover, the Taliban have once again failed to behave as a responsible state authority. This is largely because, in essence, the Taliban are a non-state force or militia rather than a political movement grounded in institutional governance. Having not come to power through any democratic or representative process, they cannot realistically be expected to function like a modern state. This state of affairs has inevitably resulted in growing chaos within Afghanistan.
In terms of policy toward Pakistan, the behaviour of the Afghan Taliban has been particularly unexpected and deeply troubling. The regime in Kabul has been hosting the largest Pakistani terrorist network, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), referred to by Pakistan as Fitnatul Khawarij. Despite repeated diplomatic appeals and even limited armed action by Pakistan against TTP hideouts on Afghan territory, the Afghan Taliban have remained obstinate and unwilling to withdraw their support or deny sanctuary to the Pakistani Taliban. As a direct consequence, terrorist attacks in Pakistan have increased manifold, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, severely undermining internal security and regional stability.
Against this backdrop, insecurity within Afghanistan itself is increasing with each passing day, while the Afghan Taliban appear either unwilling or incapable of addressing the situation. At the same time, the civilised world finds itself on the horns of a dilemma over how to respond to Afghanistan’s continuing instability. Kabul frequently levels accusations against Pakistan for allegedly supporting anti-Taliban Afghan groups, yet it has done little to stabilise its own state institutions or restore political legitimacy. A closer examination of the dynamics of insecurity under Taliban rule reveals that no foreign actor bears more responsibility for insurgency, political chaos and grave security challenges in Afghanistan than the Afghan political and social leadership itself. In other words, neither the US-led NATO forces, which occupied Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, nor Pakistan — often portrayed as the two most influential external actors — can be held as accountable as the Taliban regime itself for Afghanistan’s current predicament. This reality is evident, but it requires open eyes and honest reflection to acknowledge. The world, and Afghans themselves, must understand this truth, for without such understanding there can be no hope of peace in Afghanistan, the wider region or beyond.
Interestingly, both the Afghan Taliban rulers and their opponents belong to the same nation and state, and they have been engaged in conflict for more than 25 years. Undeniably, the Taliban also fought US-led NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, steadily gaining territory by pushing back government troops. When the Taliban were waging an insurgency against elected Afghan governments, those regimes blamed Pakistan for supporting the insurgents. Today, with the Taliban in power, they themselves blame Pakistan for destabilising Afghanistan. This contradictory narrative is not only illogical but also deeply senseless.
Why would the Afghan Taliban — a purely Afghan entity — or anti-Taliban groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) choose to dance to the tune allegedly played by Pakistan, instead of engaging with their own Afghan compatriots and broader political leadership to resolve disputes through political processes? This question must be examined within its full context, without oversimplification. Historically, local and national insurgencies are neither created nor sustained solely by foreign states or non-state actors. Pakistan, in particular, has long been disliked, if not openly resented, by many Afghans, largely due to the belief that Pakistan — as a successor state of British India — occupies what Afghans consider to be ‘Afghan’ territory. Although Afghanistan’s irredentist claims against Pakistan have no solid legal or political basis when examined through a thorough reading of history, many Afghans continue to believe in these narratives. This belief has contributed to enduring hostility toward Pakistan and is rooted in myths and unfounded legends rather than historical facts.
Therefore, no foreign actor that has had interests or presence in Afghanistan can be held more responsible for the country’s troubles than Afghan rulers and Afghan society itself. This point bears repeating: unless the world and Afghanistan recognise and address the internal roots of insecurity, instability and political chaos, there can be no meaningful way forward — regardless of how many foreign troops are deployed, how much funding is committed, or how many international conferences on Afghanistan are convened.
When it comes to identifying the root causes of Afghanistan’s multidimensional crises, the explanation is relatively straightforward, even if difficult to accept. A careful observation of Afghan political dynamics and a thorough reading of Afghan history reveal a consistent failure of successive Afghan rulers to consolidate the state and modernise society through institutionalisation, education and detribalisation. This persistent failure lies at the heart of Afghanistan’s enduring problems. Due to weak state consolidation and social modernisation, Afghans have struggled to adapt to political, economic and social developments in the wider world. Sensing this inability to keep pace with changing global realities, Afghan society gradually developed a deep suspicion of everything foreign. This suspicion, coupled with disdain, has been actively reinforced by Afghan rulers, who instead of educating their people about global changes and the necessity of adaptation, chose to stoke fear and hostility toward outsiders. Over centuries, Afghan regimes have done so to protect their own vested interests, keeping the population illiterate, uninformed and easier to govern, rather than encouraging critical thinking and questioning of authority.
Foreign players may not have acted out of goodwill toward Afghanistan or its people, but the fragility of the Afghan state and the non-modern character of Afghan society provided fertile ground for external exploitation. In a world governed by realism, every state seeks to maximise its power and wealth, often at the expense of others. History teaches this harsh lesson repeatedly, and Afghans must also come to terms with it. Moreover, to pursue interests abroad, a state must possess adequate internal strength and coherence. Without first putting its own house in order and abandoning outdated myths and mindsets, Afghan leadership cannot hope to move the country in the right direction or achieve lasting peace and stability.