Pakistan’s economy: beyond stabilisation
Recent economic data point to a noticeable improvement in several of Pakistan’s key macroeconomic indicators, strengthening the government’s argument that the economy has moved beyond the most acute phase of stabilisation.
The narrowing current account deficit, stronger remittance inflows, improved foreign exchange reserves, a recovery in foreign direct investment and growth in large-scale manufacturing all provide grounds for cautious optimism. Yet these gains remain vulnerable to external shocks and domestic structural weaknesses, making it important for policymakers to focus on a sustainable economic strategy rather than rely on temporary improvements.
The current account deficit narrowed by a substantial 34 per cent during the first two months of the current fiscal year, helped largely by stronger remittance inflows. The increase is particularly notable because it was not widely anticipated in view of the continuing conflict in the Middle East and the uncertainty it has created across the Gulf region.
One explanation being cited for the stronger remittance performance is the movement of workers from other countries out of the Gulf states because of the regional conflict, while Pakistani workers have continued to maintain their presence there. At the same time, greater reliance on official channels for transferring money to Pakistan may also have contributed to the rise in recorded remittances.
However, it would be premature to assume that this trend will continue indefinitely. Some of the factors behind the increase may prove temporary, particularly if the regional conflict is eventually resolved and displaced workers return to their previous destinations. The conflict has already demonstrated how quickly regional instability can alter economic flows, and its duration remains uncertain. Some political analysts have even suggested that the turmoil could persist for much longer.
Another development that has strengthened Pakistan’s external position is the successful issuance of $3 billion in Eurobonds through two tranches. The government raised $1.75 billion through a 5.5-year bond carrying a 7.5 per cent coupon and another $1.25 billion through a 10-year bond carrying a 7.9 per cent coupon. The proceeds have helped strengthen foreign exchange reserves and provide additional support to the external account.
The borrowing cost of these bonds is lower than the domestic borrowing rate, making the issuance appear attractive from a financing perspective. However, an important risk cannot be overlooked: the bonds are denominated and repayable in US dollars. With the Pakistani rupee historically depreciating by around 3 to 4 per cent annually, the eventual rupee cost of servicing and repaying these obligations can be considerably higher. The apparent advantage of lower interest rates must therefore be considered alongside the foreign exchange risk associated with dollar-denominated debt.
Foreign direct investment has also shown some improvement. According to the Finance Division’s monthly economic outlook and update, FDI in July 2026 increased to $223.6 million from $178.6 million in July 2025. The State Bank of Pakistan’s data put total FDI for July-August 2026 at $495 million, indicating a stronger overall performance compared with the corresponding period.
There are, however, discrepancies between the figures reported by different government institutions that need to be reconciled. The Finance Division has reported August FDI at $364.3 million, while the SBP figures indicate $316.4 million. Such differences may arise from variations in reporting or classification, but consistency in official economic data is important for assessing trends accurately.
More importantly, despite the improvement, Pakistan’s FDI remains extremely low compared with the needs of an economy of its size and with inflows received by several regional economies. The increase should therefore be viewed as an encouraging development rather than evidence that the investment problem has been resolved. Sustaining the upward trend will require greater policy predictability, a more competitive business environment and improvements in energy and infrastructure costs.
The performance of large-scale manufacturing offers another reason for cautious optimism. LSM expanded by 3.03 per cent year-on-year and 9.51 per cent month-on-month. An expansion in industrial production is particularly significant because manufacturing has a direct relationship with overall economic growth, employment, investment and tax revenues. The strongest gains were recorded in the automobile sector, which grew by 57 per cent, while garments posted growth of 22 per cent.
Yet the manufacturing recovery is facing serious challenges. The textile sector has claimed that more than 100 units have been forced to close because of a sharp increase in input costs. The industry has attributed part of this pressure to administrative measures introduced under the IMF programme. Whether all of these closures can be directly linked to those measures requires further verification, but the concerns raised by the industry cannot simply be ignored.
The weakness in private-sector credit also provides a reason for caution. According to the Finance Division’s monthly update, credit flows to the private sector remained negative, moving from negative Rs232.1 million in July-August 2025 to negative Rs393.4 million during the corresponding period of 2026. Stronger industrial output alongside weak private-sector credit raises questions about how sustainable the manufacturing recovery will be if businesses remain reluctant or unable to expand investment.
Pakistan is also operating in an increasingly difficult international environment. The Middle East conflict has disrupted energy and supply chains, while the Russia-Ukraine war continues to affect commodity markets and global trade. There is little certainty about when either conflict will end. For an import-dependent economy, prolonged disruptions create particular risks because higher fuel, freight and insurance costs can quickly feed into domestic inflation and the balance of payments.
This situation calls for a shift from short-term firefighting to long-term economic planning. Repeatedly extending subsidies may provide temporary relief, but such measures place additional pressure on an already constrained fiscal position. The government needs an energy strategy designed around the possibility of recurring global fuel shortages and persistently high prices.
Reducing energy consumption should be an important component of that strategy. Measures aimed at lowering unnecessary petrol consumption and reducing the amount of fuel required for electricity generation could help contain the import bill. Greater energy efficiency, better public transport, improved industrial technology and a stronger shift towards domestic and renewable energy sources can gradually reduce Pakistan’s exposure to international fuel shocks.
Fiscal discipline should accompany these measures. Reducing avoidable expenditure would lessen the pressure to raise revenues through repeated increases in tax rates or expansion of existing taxes. A more efficient state, combined with broader economic activity, would provide a stronger basis for sustainable revenue generation.
The latest data therefore present a mixed but encouraging picture. Improvements in the current account, remittances, foreign investment and manufacturing indicate that the economy has gained some momentum. But these gains remain exposed to geopolitical developments, currency risks, weak private-sector credit and high production costs. The challenge now is to convert temporary stabilisation into durable economic resilience. That will require policymakers to look beyond immediate crises and build an energy, fiscal and industrial strategy capable of protecting the economy from the external shocks that are increasingly becoming a permanent feature of the global environment.