As the security situation between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the Taliban regime remains precarious, China has recently hosted peace talks between the two neighboring states, with the latest reports from Beijing suggesting that negotiations are progressing. The central questions, however, are whether these peace parleys between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime can succeed in the first instance, and more importantly, whether any positive or successful negotiations between Islamabad and Kabul could translate into meaningful and lasting conflict resolution.

With regard to the new round of talks between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban in China, they do represent a positive development. Although by April 5 Beijing was claiming that discussions between Islamabad and Kabul were moving forward, it is still too early to adopt an overly optimistic outlook. To properly assess whether the talks are genuinely advancing, one must closely examine and analyze the respective positions of both sides. Pakistan’s stance has consistently been that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which it has labeled Fitna-tul-Khwarij, continues to receive tacit or overt support from the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This support allegedly enables the group to carry out attacks inside Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, resulting in the loss of hundreds of civilian and security personnel lives. Therefore, Islamabad maintains that unless the Taliban regime decisively halts any support for the TTP, the prospects for durable peace with Kabul will remain bleak.

On the other hand, the Taliban regime has repeatedly described the TTP as an internal problem of Pakistan, arguing that Islamabad is attempting to externalize its own security failures by blaming Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership also claims that reining in the TTP, despite its presence on Afghan soil, is not entirely within their control. Notably, however, the Taliban have largely remained silent on the specific allegations of direct or indirect support for the group.

A closer examination of these opposing positions reveals significant inconsistencies in the Taliban’s argument. If, as widely reported, a substantial portion of TTP fighters are operating from Afghan territory, it becomes difficult to justify labeling the issue as purely internal to Pakistan. In reality, the problem assumes a cross-border and regional dimension rather than a strictly domestic one. Furthermore, if Afghan soil is being used as a base for launching attacks into Pakistan, the Taliban’s position appears increasingly untenable. Their claim of inability to control the TTP could also be interpreted as an implicit admission of limitations as a governing authority. In this context, the Taliban regime finds it difficult to categorically oppose Pakistan’s military strikes targeting TTP hideouts inside Afghanistan. While such operations may result in collateral damage, this remains an unfortunate but often unavoidable aspect of counterterrorism efforts, even when conducted with maximum precision.

Given these realities, it is imperative that the Taliban leadership reassesses its approach. Harboring or tolerating anti-Pakistan militant groups is not only detrimental to bilateral relations but also contrary to Afghanistan’s own immediate and long-term interests. Ultimately, it is the Afghan population that bears the consequences of instability, isolation, and economic hardship resulting from such policies.

Analyzing the Taliban’s inability to effectively control the TTP reveals that this argument may hold partial validity, but it is not entirely convincing. A key underlying factor is the nature of the Taliban regime itself, which lacks broad-based political legitimacy and remains more akin to a militia than a fully institutionalized state actor. Having come to power through force rather than a widely recognized democratic mandate, the regime faces structural limitations in governance and control. As such, it may not possess the institutional capacity required to decisively confront and dismantle entrenched militant networks, whether domestic or foreign.

In these circumstances, Pakistan’s decision to conduct targeted strikes against militant sanctuaries inside Afghanistan can be viewed through the lens of self-defense. From Islamabad’s perspective, such actions are necessary to safeguard national security and protect civilian lives. This may also explain why Pakistan’s cross-border operations have not attracted widespread or sustained international condemnation, as many observers recognize the complexities of the threat environment.

However, beyond the issue of capacity, there also appears to be an element of unwillingness on the part of the Afghan Taliban to act decisively against the TTP. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the Taliban view the TTP as a form of strategic leverage. Historically, the TTP provided support to the Afghan Taliban during their insurgency against the former Afghan government, culminating in the fall of President Ashraf Ghani’s administration in 2021. At that time, Pakistan itself had supported the Afghan Taliban, a policy that, in hindsight, can be seen as strategically short-sighted.

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that successive Afghan governments have often maintained adversarial relations with Pakistan, a pattern that dates back to the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This historical mistrust has consistently shaped Islamabad’s security calculations and contributed to its cautious approach toward Kabul.

For the Taliban, retaining ties with the TTP may serve multiple purposes. Firstly, it provides a potential auxiliary force in the event of internal challenges to their rule, especially given Afghanistan’s history of factional conflict. Secondly, it offers a means of exerting pressure on Pakistan. By distancing themselves from Islamabad and supporting anti-Pakistan elements, the Taliban may seek to counter perceptions that they are overly dependent on or aligned with Pakistan. This is particularly relevant in the context of domestic legitimacy, where anti-Pakistan sentiment has often been used as a tool for political validation.

In light of these complex and deeply entrenched dynamics, it is difficult to be overly optimistic about the success of peace talks between Islamabad and Kabul, regardless of whether they are facilitated by China or any other external actor. While negotiations under Beijing’s auspices may produce short-term de-escalation or a temporary cessation of hostilities, the prospects for long-term peace remain uncertain. Unless the Afghan Taliban fundamentally alter their strategic calculus—specifically by abandoning their support for the TTP and reframing their perception of Pakistan as an adversary—any progress achieved through dialogue is likely to remain fragile and reversible.