Terror has struck again and this time with an unprecedented ferocity. The hijacking of the Peshawar-bound Jaffar Express, which had departed from Quetta carrying around 450 passengers on March 11, showed a new upswing in the operational capacity of terrorist networks and their ability to bypass the state’s intelligence apparatus. The train came under a rocket and gun attack by terrorists in a remote, rugged part of Bolan district, forcing it to stop. The assailants then took hundreds of passengers hostage before fleeing into the adjoining mountains.
Through a well coordinated rescue operation, the security forces were able to free more than 150 passengers in the face of stiff resistance by the terrorists using hostages, including women and children, as human shields. The banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, with reports suggesting that its attackers were in touch with international handlers, including an Afghanistan-based mastermind, via satellite telephones. No doubt, Balochistan is being destabilised by foreign powers because China is making investments as a vital element of its Belt & Road Initiative. Additionally, powers hostile to Iran are trying to promote unrest in Balochistan-Sistan sector that straddles Pakistan’s border with Iran.
For the last two decades, Pakistan has been the target of a series of terror attacks. Terrorists have attacked schools and places of worship, train stations, airports, government and military installations, as well as business hubs. In recent months, the Balochistan Liberation Front and other terrorist outfits have greatly stepped up their violent activities with covert and overt support of overseas networks, which offer financial support, training and ideological backing. It is relevant to add here that the BLA was also responsible for Pakistan’s deadliest terror attack of 2024 when a suicide bomber killed at least 25 civilians and soldiers at Quetta railway station. Besides BLA and TTP there are numerous smaller militant groups who operate across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
Our counterterror mechanisms and operations have failed to tackle them effectively. It seems our counterterror strategies suffer from gaps in kinetic operations as well as intelligence gathering systems. Above all, we seem to lack strategic vision in addressing the root causes of violence. Unable to make an effective use of non-military measures, such as political engagement, economic development and de-radicalisation efforts, the authorities seem clueless about how to face the challenge in an effective manner.
It is pertinent to note here that a key recommendation of the 2014 National Action Plan was the strengthening of the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA). But NACTA has been unable to play the role that was envisioned for it. Eliminating a threat rooted in an extremist mindset that has developed over generations is impossible without an integrated and well coordinated national response, encompassing both military and civilian elements that takes into account the deeper social, political and economic grievances that underlie radicalisation and feeds extremism.
So far, purely kinetic responses have failed to address systemic grievances.Instead, such an approach has deepened alienation and fuelled further resistance. The cycle of violence in Balochistan can be traced to four kinds of grievances: political exclusion, economic deprivation, administrative incompetence and resource exploitation. Political exclusion means rule by a non-representative governance structure. Economic deprivation relates to lack of opportunities ineducation, employment, health, and income. Administrative incompetence describes a bureaucratic apparatus that fails to deliver both services and justice to the people. Finally, growing perception of plunder of indigenous resource creates a sense of frustration and anger. It is also widely believed that the Centre by bribing the sardars has marginalised the bulk of Baloch population.
At the same time enforced disappearances and missing persons remain a major issue. It alienates the common Balochis because they see their lives as being of far less value than others’ in the federation. Recently, Sardar Akhtar Mengal said he has a list of 5,000 missing Baloch on the floor of the National Assembly, and no one challenged this figure. From a national perspective, we must see the Balochistan question as a battle for hearts and minds. More important than economic rights are political rights. No wonder in the last election in Balochistan politicians who held their constituencies since the 1977 elections, lost their seats.
We must remember that insurgent violence in Balochistan is a symptom, not the disease. The disease lies in systemic failures — political, economic and administrative. As a nation, we should focus more on finding a cure for the disease, not merely on the symptom. Initiating a process of dialogue and reconciliation can prove more useful in finding a durable solution to the Balochistan question.