The former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were merged into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province in May 2018 through the 25th Constitutional Amendment. The merger was envisioned as a historic step aimed at mainstreaming, stabilising, and accelerating the socio-economic development of the long-neglected tribal region. However, nearly seven years on, the promise of integration and development remains largely unfulfilled.
Unfortunately, successive federal and KP government strategies to mainstream and develop ex-FATA—now officially referred to as the Merged Tribal Districts (MTDs)—have failed to achieve their stated objectives in any meaningful or sustainable manner. Even symbolic political gestures have yielded little impact. For instance, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which governs KP, selected Sohail Afridi, a young political worker from Khyber tribal district, for the position of chief minister of KP under the leadership of its founder chairman Imran Khan. Yet, this representation has not translated into visible improvements in governance, infrastructure, or socio-economic development in the MTDs. The disconnect between political symbolism and actual development outcomes remains stark.
As a consequence, the tribal belt—which began turning into a hub of local, national, and international extremist, militant, and terrorist groups around 2005—continues to host and reproduce militancy, not merely in physical terms but, more alarmingly, in ideological mindsets. Groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), described by the Pakistani state as Fitna-tul-Khawarij since 2007, emerged from this region and continue to find space to operate. Militancy and terrorism thriving in the Pakhtun tribal areas have not only devastated the MTDs but have also drained the entire KP province and inflicted grave damage on Pakistan as a whole. At the core of this crisis lies the chronic underdevelopment of the tribal districts, which has provided fertile ground for militant recruitment and radicalisation.
It must be emphasised that militancy, extremism, and terrorism in the Pakhtun tribal regions did not emerge spontaneously. Rather, they are the direct outcome of the anti-Soviet Afghan War (1980–1988) and the Pakistani state’s deliberate social engineering in Pakhtun society. While violence existed in the region historically, these policies transformed the tribal belt into a sustained hotbed of militancy. The fallout of the Afghan war, followed by prolonged instability and civil war in Afghanistan, has continuously threatened Pakistan’s national interests, particularly its territorial integrity and sovereignty. After serving as Pakistan’s frontline during the anti-Soviet jihad, ex-FATA was effectively abandoned, leaving its population at the mercy of fundamentalist elements nurtured through American funding and General Zia-ul-Haq’s clientelist alliance with the United States.
Due to the prolonged absence of effective state writ, religious fundamentalist forces amassed extraordinary power in the tribal belt, evolving into what can best be described as a hydra-headed monster. During and especially after the Afghan war, the economy and development trajectory of the MTDs deteriorated severely. As repeatedly observed, economic deprivation and structural underdevelopment have been the root causes of unrest in all its manifestations across Pakhtun tribal lands. Given their strategic geographical location, Pakistan’s tribal areas have always carried immense international importance, making neglect even more perilous.
At the time of the merger in 2018, the federal government led by Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) reportedly promised to allocate Rs1,000 billion over a ten-year period—Rs100 billion annually—for the development of the MTDs. However, this commitment has remained largely rhetorical and has effectively turned into a pipe dream. Instead, the burden of financing development has been unfairly shifted onto the already cash-strapped KP province. KP has been forced to spend billions on the MTDs, severely compromising development in the rest of the already underdeveloped province and creating new fiscal and political challenges.
Despite these expenditures, tangible economic and infrastructural development in the MTDs remains minimal. Rampant corruption among administrative structures and contractors has played a decisive and independent role in undermining development efforts. Without an elaborate, well-thought-out, and context-sensitive development strategy, any future plans for the MTDs will remain superficial and ultimately futile. Worse still, militant, extremist, and terrorist groups will continue to entrench themselves further, exploiting prevailing conditions to expand their influence. Given the severity of deprivation, the MTDs require the injection of at least $2 billion annually to meaningfully integrate them into Pakistan’s mainstream economy and shield KP—and the country at large—from their destabilising spillover effects. The economic development needs of the former FATA are, in short, colossal.
To reverse fundamentalist tendencies through economic development, any proposed strategy must be grounded in the socio-economic realities of the region. Unemployment is widespread, while poverty levels exceed 70 percent. Therefore, development planning must focus on short-term, high-impact deliverables capable of addressing unemployment and poverty on an emergency, war-footing basis. Among these challenges, unemployment is of paramount significance and demands urgent attention.
A viable development strategy must also account for the demographic reality that nearly 50 percent of the population in the MTDs is under the age of 15. This youth bulge has become particularly vulnerable to exploitation by religious fundamentalists, who offer financial incentives and monthly stipends to attract recruits. It is now an open secret that local Taliban groups fix regular remuneration for their members. Contrary to the assumption that recruits are driven solely by ideology, economic deprivation remains the principal factor inflating militant ranks.
Sustainability must form the next pillar of any development framework. Given the conservative social order and entrenched tribal structures, development initiatives face persistent risks of reversal. To counter this, the scale of intervention must be transformative. A combined vertical-horizontal development approach could prove effective. Vertically, the government should invest more than Rs250 billion annually in mega infrastructure projects. Horizontally, development funds must be equitably distributed across all tribal districts to avoid regional disparities.
Ultimately, the economic future of the former FATA hinges on rapid and large-scale industrialisation. Industrial development—if pursued sincerely and at scale—could fundamentally alter the region’s trajectory. Alongside agro-based industries such as food processing, capital-intensive industries including cement, textiles, and engineering units must be established. Skepticism about feasibility is misplaced: Lakki Marwat already hosts one of Pakistan’s largest cement plants, while Bannu is home to a major woollen mill producing high-quality fabrics. Both districts lie adjacent to the tribal areas, demonstrating that industrialisation in the region is not only possible but achievable with political will and sustained investment.