The claim by the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) of responsibility for the September 3 suicide terrorist attack in Quetta targeting the rally of the mainstream political party, Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M), in which senior leadership of the main opposition Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Ain-e-Pakistan (TTAP or Movement for Safeguarding the Constitution of Pakistan) was also participating, must raise serious concerns regarding the extremely precarious security situation in Balochistan.
The province, which has been witnessing unabated terrorist attacks by separatist ethnic Baloch groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) for over a decade, is also experiencing a sharp spike in attacks by religiously motivated terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).
The IS-K, which is known as the regional chapter of the globally designated terrorist organization, Islamic State (IS), has a very strong footprint in Balochistan at this point in time, and this development is very meaningful and disturbing. Here it is important to note that the largest Pakistani terrorist group, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a banned outfit now referred to by the state as Fitna-ul-Khawarij-e-Hindustan (an India-supported terrorist outfit), has also become active again suddenly in Balochistan. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that while the TTP is active in the Pakhtun parts of Balochistan, the IS-K is focusing its activities in the Baloch areas. The provincial capital Quetta is although a Pakhtun-dominated city, but as being the capital of Balochistan, named after the ethnic Baloch population, it also seriously claims to be a Baloch city. But most people are unaware of the fact that Quetta, although dominated by Pakhtuns, has different sectors dominated by key ethnic groups. For instance, Kuchlak and downtown Meezan Chowk, Liaquat Bazaar, Zarghoon Road, and Pishin Pathak are dominated by Pakhtuns, Zariab Road is dominated by Baloch while Hazara Town is dominated by Hazaras. Keeping this in view, the attack by the IS-K in Quetta on the rally of BNP-M, a party working for the rights of ethnic Balochs taking place on Sariab Road, means that the group was especially focusing on ethnic Baloch leadership.
On the basis of the facts, one could analyze that there is some kind of a tacit collaboration and coordination between the IS-K and the TTP in Balochistan. This is indeed a very serious matter for Pakistan and its law enforcement agencies. Although the TTP considers the Afghan Taliban and their late founder Mullah Omar Mujahid as their ideological father, whereas the IS-K has had serious differences with the Afghan Taliban, the TTP has had a soft corner for the IS-K. The security apparatus needs to look into the fact that what is the level of coordination between the TTP and the IS-K and what stakes are involved for both the groups to join hands in Balochistan. Only then could they come up with a strong counter response.
In addition to attacks in Balochistan, the IS-K targeting of key political groups of the province and national opposition groups has raised many eyebrows. Although the IS-K has been considering secular-democratic politics and political parties as something working against their understanding of religion, it has not been consistently attacking them, which is something quite confusing. The only rationale for such attacks on the part of the IS-K is to put the political parties and politicians on the defensive. Behind this, the IS-K and its perpetrators have a very well-orchestrated strategy that, seeing the security situation in Balochistan worsen, the IS-K wants to create greater space for itself. For this, the IS-K thinks that browbeating and, if possible, eliminating democratic groups is essential. However, the IS-K may be able to temporarily intimidate political parties but not for the long run. Here the state has to understand the chicanery of the IS-K, and it shall put its weight behind political groups because they could be engaged in a dialogue due to their non-violent makeup and belief in the state, but groups like the IS-K cannot be talked to. Here it may be remembered that the IS-K has been trying over the years to run over Balochistan province; however, it has not been able to do so to a great extent, like the TTP once did in 2009-2010 to completely control North and South Waziristan. In this regard, the IS-K has been staging massive attacks on political groups. For instance, on July 13, 2018, when it claimed responsibility for the attack on an election-related corner meeting of Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) in Mastung near Quetta that had killed at least 150 people.
In this connection, it must be recalled that in September 2016, Pakistani authorities reportedly had busted a huge network of Daesh in Balochistan. Even then, in these lines, we had raised concerns regarding the IS-K’s growing presence in Balochistan. Security agencies had also arrested the top ten commanders of IS, who were said to be on a mission in the country to recruit thousands of foot soldiers for the IS Middle East’s war theater, specifically in Iraq and Syria. The group once controlled over large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria but then lost a good part of it to state and international forces in both the countries. It was then revealed that the arrested top ten commanders had just returned after meeting the Daesh head of Khorasan (Pak-Afghan-Iran-India-Central Asia) region, namely Hafiz Saeed Khan, in Afghanistan before his death in a US drone strike in Afghanistan a few weeks back. Many of them had also met Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the late kingpin of the IS in Syria and Iraq. According to authorities, “He (Hafiz Saeed Khan) had ordered them to spread chaos in Pakistan and create a situation for the Daesh caliphate in Pakistan.”
All the incidents and facts show the threat which the Afghanistan-based Khorasan chapter of IS poses to the security of Pakistan and its citizens. However, another important aspect of the unearthing of the IS network in Daesh in Balochistan in 2016 was that some of the group’s commanders, who had been arrested, were directly in contact with the central leadership based in Iraq and Syria. This also had demonstrated how important Pakistan has been from IS’s central leadership point of view and matters significantly in their strategic calculation. This importance of Pakistan and specifically Balochistan for the IS-K continues today. The recent attack in Quetta on the BNP-M rally must be understood against the backdrop of this IS-K long strategy regarding Pakistan.
Even at the time of the busting of the IS-K network in Pakistan in 2016 too, we had written in these lines that terrorist networks like the IS were not very easy to be eliminated as they had a tendency to resurface. The recent attacks by the IS-K in Balochistan are indicative of this fact.
The IS is having a strong anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian agenda, and as Balochistan province also makes the border of Pakistan with Iran, the IS would love to have a strong network in the province. It may be mentioned here that Iran’s own separatist Baloch group, Jundullah, which later put on religious garb, also cultivated a network in Pakistani Balochistan. Iran also has a province by the name of Sistan-Balochistan, which is a Sunni-dominated province in the predominantly Shiite country.
The ethnic-based conflict in Balochistan has kept the province volatile. Pakistan’s arch-rival, India, has been taking advantage of this situation to create problems for Pakistan. The arrest of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Yadav years back by Pakistani authorities in Balochistan points towards this fact. It is a signature tactic of terrorist groups to exploit any conflict and crisis to their utter advantage. Thus, the IS has wanted to take advantage of the volatile situation, which has been prevailing in Balochistan for years.