The recent signing of the highly significant mutual defence pact among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, along with Pakistan’s central role in the peace negotiations between the United States and Iran aimed at ending their ongoing war, has been the talk of the town in Pakistan and important world capitals. At the same time, however, Islamabad’s relations with Russia have received relatively little attention in the national and international media, as well as among experts of international relations, despite their growing importance over the last few years.
The most important events related to Pakistan’s relations with Russia included Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s visit to Islamabad on October 15–16, 2024, to attend the 23rd Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of Government. The visit was important because, during his stay, Russian Prime Minister Mishustin also held formal bilateral talks with Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif aimed at expanding economic and regional cooperation. However, Russia’s recognition last year of the Afghan Taliban regime has somewhat raised doubts in Islamabad regarding Moscow’s role in Afghanistan and the wider region. Russia has been the first, and so far the only, country to extend diplomatic recognition to the Afghan Taliban regime, which Islamabad and most other countries have so far refused to recognise. For Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban regime has increasingly become a rival because of its consistent and all-out support for the Pakistani Taliban network, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which maintains sanctuaries in Afghanistan and carries out attacks inside Pakistan. Against this backdrop, Russia’s recognition of the Taliban regime was quite surprising for Pakistan.
Significantly, when, at the fag end of his tenure, former Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Russia in February 2022, on the eve of Moscow’s military invasion of neighbouring Ukraine, to initiate a new era of relations, mainly focused on economic ties between Russia and Pakistan, many eyebrows were raised in Western capitals. Although Imran Khan had repeatedly clarified that he visited Moscow only to request and secure cheap oil and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) supplies from Russia to ease the burgeoning energy crisis at home, most Western countries considered the visit to have strategic motives. Mr Khan was subsequently ousted from power through a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly by opposition parties after they secured the support of dissidents from his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and smaller coalition partners. After being shown the door, the former prime minister accused Washington of dislodging his government because of his visit to Moscow.
In a historical context, Russia-Pakistan friendly ties are not only very important but also extremely interesting. Although both Pakistan and Russia have bitter historical memories of working against each other’s interests, by the dawn of the second quarter of the 21st century, the two countries have few alternatives but to improve their mutual ties. As Pakistan shifted, at least avowedly, its foreign-policy paradigm in 2020 from a geo-strategic to a geo-economic approach, its relations with Russia in this context have become extremely important.
The most important factor for Pakistan in developing extensive economic relations with Russia is the latter’s huge reserves of oil and gas. Potentially, Russia could supply large volumes of oil and gas to Pakistan, and that too at discounted prices, which could be instrumental not only in overcoming the country’s chronic energy deficiency but also in significantly reducing Islamabad’s oil import bill. Equally importantly, crude oil and gas supplies to Pakistan from Russia could reduce the country’s overdependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas supplies, especially from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
Although Russia may not gain substantial immediate economic benefits from providing crude oil and LPG to Pakistan at reduced rates, such an arrangement could offer Moscow significant diplomatic and political advantages. Such supplies would make Pakistan increasingly dependent upon Russia, potentially offsetting some, if not all, of the influence of Washington and its Western allies over Pakistan. Russia still considers the Cold War-era NATO to be its strategic nemesis, while Moscow has justified its military intervention in Ukraine and the occupation and annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory as measures intended to prevent NATO from bringing Ukraine and other Russian neighbouring countries into its fold. This eastward expansion of NATO has long been viewed by Russia as a US-orchestrated strategy aimed at strategically encircling Russia and extending Western influence into what Moscow regards as its traditional sphere of influence.
Therefore, greater energy cooperation between Russia and Pakistan is in the national interest of both countries. However, it has largely been the fear of US-Western opposition and possible economic retaliation that has prevented Islamabad from moving much further with the idea of asking Moscow, in all earnestness, to provide oil and LNG at discounted prices. When Russian Energy Minister Nikolay Shulginov visited Pakistan, the two countries announced that they had reached an agreement on the supply of crude oil to Pakistan. Russian authorities, however, informed Pakistan that Russia was not in a position to supply cheap LNG in the following few months and that Pakistan should instead engage directly with Russian energy companies, such as Gazprom, in this regard. Nevertheless, both countries announced that they had agreed “in principle” on energy cooperation.
It is proverbially said that there are many slips between the tongue and the lips, meaning that there is still much to be done before a final achievement or agreement is reached. Keeping in view the understandable opposition of the United States and India towards energy cooperation between Russia and Pakistan, as well as ambiguity and a lack of vision on the part of our strategists, including the political leadership, Moscow and Islamabad may yet fail to reach a final agreement on the supply of Russian crude oil to Pakistan at discounted rates.
If there is already such opposition to Russia-Pakistan economic cooperation internationally and within Pakistan, then the scale of antagonism that could emerge if both countries were to initiate substantive cooperation in the fields of defence and security is only imaginable. Nevertheless, cooperation between these two states, particularly for Pakistan in the realm of defence and security, could become critically important, especially at a time when the US and the wider West may not be looking favourably towards Islamabad.
However, any detailed analysis of defence cooperation at this point in time would be difficult and, to some extent, beside the point. Nevertheless, the situation in Afghanistan that has developed since the Taliban took over the country in August 2021, and the hesitation of the entire international community—including Russia and Pakistan—to extend diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime, remain key matters of mutual interest between Moscow and Islamabad.
It is encouraging that Russia and Pakistan are coordinating their strategies regarding the Afghan Taliban regime. In this context, Moscow’s sudden recognition of the Afghan Taliban regime was somewhat surprising. Despite the fact that the Afghan Taliban cannot necessarily be trusted to keep their promises to the international community, Russia could likewise not have been certain that the Taliban would fulfil any commitments regarding preventing anti-Russian elements from using Afghan soil.
Pakistan has already been left in the lurch by the Afghan Taliban, which has allowed Pakistan’s largest terrorist network, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, to operate from its soil. Therefore, both Russia and Pakistan still need to coordinate their strategies closely on Afghanistan. This is particularly important because instability in Afghanistan directly affects the security interests of both countries and can undermine efforts to promote regional connectivity.
Pakistan’s geo-economic aspirations also make closer engagement with Russia increasingly relevant. Russia possesses enormous energy resources, while Pakistan occupies a strategically important geographic position connecting South Asia with Central and potentially Central Asian markets. Improved relations could therefore create opportunities in energy, transportation, trade, investment and regional connectivity. At the same time, Islamabad must carefully balance its relations with Moscow, Washington, Beijing, Riyadh, Ankara and other important partners rather than allowing any bilateral relationship to become a source of unnecessary confrontation with another major power.
Pakistan-Russia relations are consequently much more significant than the limited attention they currently receive might suggest. The two countries have travelled a complicated historical path, moving from periods of considerable strategic mistrust to cautious engagement and increasing cooperation. Their interests do not coincide on every issue, but neither do they need to. What matters is whether they can identify areas of mutual interest—particularly energy, trade, regional connectivity and Afghanistan—and develop practical cooperation without unnecessarily turning their relationship into a zero-sum geopolitical alignment.
The changing regional and global order provides both Islamabad and Moscow with an opportunity to redefine their relationship. For Pakistan, closer economic engagement with Russia could diversify its sources of energy and investment, strengthen its geo-economic position and provide greater strategic flexibility. For Russia, stronger ties with Pakistan could enhance its connectivity with South Asia and expand its diplomatic and economic presence in a strategically important region.
The challenge is to move beyond declarations of intent and translate political goodwill into concrete projects. Pakistan and Russia have already demonstrated that dialogue is possible. The next step should be to develop a sustained framework for economic, energy and regional cooperation while maintaining necessary caution on sensitive strategic and security issues. If Islamabad and Moscow can manage this delicate balance, their relationship could become an important pillar of regional peace, connectivity and economic integration across South and Central Asia.