The statement by Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khwaja Asif, that his country was in an “open war” with the Afghan Taliban regime, along with reports quoting unnamed senior Pakistani military officials who warned that Islamabad would continue attacks inside Afghan territory unless Kabul took verifiable action against militant groups, has significantly escalated tensions between the two sides. These developments have raised fears of a further expansion of armed conflict between Islamabad and Kabul, particularly as Pakistan has reportedly ruled out holding further dialogue with the Afghan Taliban on the issue of the Afghanistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The current confrontation began in late February following a series of persistent attacks by the TTP — a group that the Pakistani state now labels Fitna-tul-Khawarij. In response to these attacks, Pakistan carried out air strikes inside Afghanistan targeting alleged militant hideouts. According to reports, the strikes were conducted in at least six Afghan provinces as well as the capital city, Kabul, hitting what Islamabad described as terrorist infrastructure and Afghan military installations.
In retaliation, Afghan Taliban forces reportedly launched artillery and mortar attacks on six Pakistani districts in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The exchange marked one of the most serious military confrontations between the two sides since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan. Pakistan subsequently intensified its air operations, targeting militant sanctuaries and Afghan military positions in the southern Afghan provinces of Kandahar Province and Helmand Province. These regions are widely considered the political and ideological heartland of the Afghan Taliban movement.
Significantly, these strikes appear to be the first time Pakistan has directly targeted Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan since the group returned to power in 2021 — and arguably the first such action since the Taliban movement itself emerged in 1994. The escalation is particularly noteworthy given Pakistan’s historical role as the principal supporter of the Afghan Taliban. Islamabad was instrumental in helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996 and became the first country to formally recognize the regime. Pakistan also persuaded its close allies, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, to extend diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government at that time.
However, during their first period in power from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban hosted a range of militant and terrorist organizations from different parts of the world, including groups from the Middle East, South Asia, China, Southeast Asia and even Europe. Among these was Al-Qaeda, which carried out the devastating attacks on the United States on September 11 attacks. Following those attacks, a US-led coalition under NATO intervened in Afghanistan and removed the Taliban regime from power in November 2001.
From 2001 until 2021, the Taliban waged a prolonged insurgency against the US-backed Afghan government. Throughout this period, many Taliban leaders and their families reportedly lived in Pakistan, often with varying degrees of official tolerance or support. Meanwhile, the TTP — which had emerged as the largest Pakistani militant network — found refuge across the border in Afghanistan after being driven out of Pakistan by military operations.
The eventual collapse of the Afghan government led by Ashraf Ghani in 2021 occurred after the withdrawal of US and NATO forces. That withdrawal was carried out under the framework of the Doha Agreement signed in February 2020 between the United States and the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, Pakistan played an important role in facilitating negotiations that led to this agreement.
Under the Doha Agreement, the Taliban had pledged to renounce militant activity, allow the formation of an inclusive political system in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghan territory would not be used by militant groups to threaten other countries. Most importantly, they committed that Afghanistan would not serve as a safe haven for foreign militant organizations.
However, since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban have been widely accused by Pakistani officials of allowing the TTP to operate freely from Afghan territory. Islamabad maintains that the Afghan Taliban have not only failed to restrain the group but have indirectly encouraged it to carry out attacks inside Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. If these accusations are accurate, they would represent a clear violation of the commitments made under the Doha Agreement and reinforce the perception that those assurances were largely tactical promises aimed at facilitating the Taliban’s return to power.
Against this background, Pakistan’s declaration of an “open war” with the Afghan Taliban appears to reflect growing frustration within the country’s leadership. Several rounds of negotiations between Pakistani officials and Taliban representatives — at times even involving commanders of the TTP — failed to produce any meaningful progress. The fundamental obstacle has been Kabul’s unwillingness to sever ties with the TTP. Pakistan has repeatedly asked the Taliban regime to make a clear choice between maintaining relations with the TTP, which Islamabad considers a terrorist organization, and preserving stable relations with Pakistan, its most important neighbour and former benefactor.
So far, Islamabad believes that the Taliban leadership has effectively chosen to support the TTP. This perception has created a deep sense of disillusionment and betrayal within Pakistan’s political and security establishment. Many in Pakistan’s leadership now view the Taliban regime as a hostile actor that is enabling terrorism against Pakistan while simultaneously refusing to address Islamabad’s security concerns.
As a result, Pakistan’s policy toward the Afghan Taliban appears to be undergoing a significant shift. Increasingly, the regime in Kabul is being portrayed not as a partner but as a militant authority that seized power through armed force and continues to behave more like an insurgent movement than a responsible state. From Islamabad’s perspective, such a regime cannot be trusted and must be treated as a security threat.
A recent report in a Pakistani newspaper quoted a senior unnamed security official as saying that Pakistan would not hesitate to target the top leadership of the Afghan Taliban if credible intelligence justified such action. This could potentially include the movement’s reclusive supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. Such statements represent a very serious escalation in rhetoric and underscore the deteriorating nature of relations between the two sides.
At the same time, Pakistani officials emphasize that tensions with the Taliban regime should not be confused with Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan people, which have historically remained close and largely positive. Pakistan has increasingly highlighted the human rights situation in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, arguing that the regime has once again imposed severe restrictions and committed widespread violations against Afghan citizens.
Within Afghanistan itself, the Taliban remain controversial. While the group has restored a degree of stability after years of war, its rule is widely criticized for its authoritarian policies and severe limitations on political freedoms, education and women’s rights. Many Afghans have long believed that the Taliban were initially empowered with Pakistan’s support — a perception that has shaped public attitudes toward Pakistan over the years.
If Islamabad now clearly distances itself from the Taliban regime, it may gradually help reshape Afghan public opinion toward Pakistan in the long run. Such a shift could potentially improve relations between Pakistan and Afghan society even if tensions with the Taliban leadership continue.
Meanwhile, armed opposition to the Taliban is also re-emerging. The National Resistance Front led by Ahmad Massoud — the son of the famed anti-Soviet commander Ahmad Shah Massoud — has vowed to intensify its struggle against the Taliban regime. Ahmad Shah Massoud was widely respected for his resistance to both Soviet forces and later Taliban rule, and his legacy continues to inspire opposition movements in Afghanistan.
Given the current trajectory, the prospects for negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban regime appear extremely limited. The situation is therefore likely to deteriorate further in the coming months. Much will depend on how aggressively Pakistan chooses to pursue the TTP inside Afghan territory and how the Taliban leadership responds to continued Pakistani military pressure. The risk is that what has so far been a series of cross-border strikes could evolve into a broader and more sustained conflict between the two neighbours.