Under the current regime of the Afghan Taliban, officially known as the Emirate-e-Islami Afghanistan (EIA), Afghanistan has consistently urged Pakistan to engage in talks with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the largest terrorist network based in Afghanistan. About a month ago, the Afghan Taliban once again offered to mediate negotiations between Pakistan and the TTP. However, Pakistan has unequivocally rejected any discussions with the banned group, reiterating its demand that Kabul take action against terrorists operating from Afghan soil into Pakistan.

Pakistan has reacted strongly to the Afghan Taliban’s offer to mediate. Recently, the Foreign Office spokesperson, during a weekly press briefing, affirmed that Pakistan has no intention of negotiating with a group responsible for killing Pakistani citizens. Islamabad’s position remains clear: while it respects Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it expects the Afghan government to uphold its own sovereignty by acting against terror groups using Afghan territory to launch attacks on Pakistan.

In the past, particularly in 2021, the Pakistani government engaged in talks with the TTP. While no formal agreement was reached, both sides agreed to a temporary ceasefire on the condition that several key militant commanders and foot soldiers, some detained for more than a decade, would be released. This ceasefire lasted only a few months before TTP attacks resumed.

Public opinion in Pakistan is divided on the issue of negotiating with the TTP. The dominant view is that the state should never negotiate with a militant-terrorist group, as doing so would be tantamount to surrender and would endanger Pakistan’s security and stability. A minority opinion, however, argues that endless fighting is unsustainable and that peace talks are necessary to end a constant source of tension and insecurity in the country.

The question of whether peace talks should take place depends largely on the nature of the militant group and its demands. Understanding the TTP and its objectives is crucial in this regard. The TTP was formed in 2007, following the Lal Masjid incident in Islamabad, when the regime of General Pervez Musharraf conducted a military operation against the mosque’s administration and students. These students had resorted to violence to demand the imposition of their version of Shariah law in Pakistan. Rather than pursuing their aims through political means, they had taken up arms to enforce ‘Shariah’ by force. The government’s successful operation against the Lal Masjid militants sparked a backlash across the country, particularly in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where militants had been gaining ground. With the U.S. and NATO forces waging an all-out war against the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan, as an official ally of the U.S. in the global war on terror, became a target for groups like Al Qaeda, which supported TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP then demanded that Islamabad sever its ties with Washington, which they viewed as an ‘infidel’ force fighting against Islam in Afghanistan and beyond, or face further terrorist attacks.

As it was nearly impossible for Pakistan to break its alliance with the United States, the TTP began targeting Pakistani civilians and security forces across the country, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the tribal areas (FATA). This campaign of violence has resulted in the deaths of around 90,000 Pakistanis, including approximately 10,000 security personnel from the military, paramilitary, and police forces. The TTP’s actions have left deep scars, with the group responsible for extensive bloodshed and destruction. Moreover, the TTP’s doctrine and demands remain unclear and fundamentally unacceptable. For instance, the group rejects the Constitution of Pakistan and continues to hold this position.

In the current context, peace talks with the TTP do not appear logical. Firstly, the group has splintered into numerous factions, lacking the unified command and control structure it once had under its founders, Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. Secondly, since 2022, TTP attacks have spiked, undoing the relative peace and stability Pakistan experienced between 2017 and 2021. With the TTP rampaging across the country, there seems little rationale for initiating talks.

It is important to note that the rise in TTP attacks coincided with the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul on August 15, 2021. After seizing control of Afghanistan, the Taliban freed hundreds of militants imprisoned by the previous Afghan governments of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. Among these prisoners were a significant number of TTP militants who had fled to Afghanistan when Pakistan launched military operations against them. Karzai and Ghani’s governments had detained these TTP members as leverage against Islamabad. Meanwhile, many of these TTP militants fought alongside the Afghan Taliban, helping them defeat the Afghan National Security Forces. As a result, the Afghan Taliban owe much to the TTP for their critical support in their victory.

Although Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban has historically been close, the major point of contention between the two is the Taliban’s continued sheltering and protection of the TTP in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban have repeatedly stated that they will not allow Afghan soil to be used against any of their neighbors, particularly Pakistan. However, they have also expressed a desire to reconcile Pakistan with the TTP. Unfortunately, given the TTP’s history of violence and the bloodshed it has caused in Pakistan, it is difficult for Islamabad to consider talks, especially on the TTP’s terms.

While holding talks with a militant or terrorist group is not inherently a bad idea, the state must ensure that such negotiations are aimed at disarming the group and ending its violence. The goal should be to divide the militants into hardcore elements and those willing to give up arms, rather than allowing the group to regroup and pose a renewed threat to the state and its citizens. In the case of the TTP, past peace talks have allowed the group to reorganize and resurge. Therefore, any future negotiations with the TTP seem implausible under the current circumstances.