The United States is set to hold a pivotal presidential election in November, where former President Donald Trump, representing the Republican Party, will be challenged by Vice President Kamala Harris of the Democratic party. While the global implications of the election will be significant, Pakistan will not be an exception.

The next U.S. president will need to engage proactively with Pakistan, in contrast to the seemingly indifferent approach of current President Joe Biden. Pakistan is already facing considerable political and economic instability, and further deterioration of the situation would not be in the interests of the U.S. or the world.

For Pakistan, it is essential to recognize that the United States is the most powerful country in the world, and Pakistan’s strategic importance has ensured a long-standing relationship, despite many ups and downs. Although U.S.-Pakistan relations are long-established, the 21st century has seen these ties dominated by the conflict in Afghanistan. In recent years, many analysts have viewed the bilateral relationship through the lens of the Afghan conflict, but this perspective overlooks broader issues in the relationship and its potential for improvement.

Pakistan has recently negotiated a substantial $7 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to address its severe macroeconomic challenges. It is important for policymakers in Pakistan to understand that international economic decisions are often shaped by political considerations. Given the U.S.’s significant voting power in international financial institutions like the IMF, it becomes crucial for Pakistan to be mindful of Washington’s interests when seeking financial assistance. Flexibility on certain political issues may be necessary to secure the desired economic outcomes.

Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has maintained several key objectives in Pakistan. These include securing Pakistan’s full support in the Global War on Terror (GWoT), involving military and counterinsurgency operations in the tribal areas, as well as logistical and intelligence support, especially concerning Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen. Washington is also concerned with preventing Pakistan from proliferating nuclear material or technology, particularly to Iran. Additionally, the U.S. seeks Pakistan’s support in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts, as well as alignment with its stance against Iran. Washington has also pressured Pakistan to grant U.S. companies access to the Gwadar Port instead of China and seeks to reduce Pakistan-India tensions without necessarily resolving the key issue of Kashmir.

It is important to note that many of these U.S. objectives are at odds with Pakistan’s own strategic interests, particularly regarding China and India. Pakistan’s relationship with China, both strategic and economic, is of great importance, while U.S. policy has often been focused on securing its own objectives at the expense of Pakistan’s interests. This patron-client dynamic that has characterized U.S.-Pakistan relations in the past must evolve to reflect the changing times. Both Pakistan and the U.S. must recognize the need for a transformation in their relationship to address current realities.

U.S.-Pakistan relations, dating back to the early 1950s, have experienced significant fluctuations. For the U.S., Pakistan has often been regarded as a client state, expected to serve U.S. interests when needed. This dynamic resulted in a patron-client relationship between the two nations. Whether it was providing covert airbases during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union, acting as an intermediary between the U.S. and Communist China in the late 1960s and early 1970s, supporting the CIA-led war in Afghanistan against the USSR in the 1980s, or playing a pivotal role in the post-9/11 U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWoT), Pakistan has frequently acted as a crucial, albeit instrumental, ally in advancing U.S. foreign and security objectives.

In many instances, Pakistan, or its ruling elite, has gone to great lengths to accommodate U.S. interests, often at the expense of its own sovereignty and national priorities. A striking example of this is Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1960 threat to bomb Peshawar, home to the U.S.’s secret Badaber Airbase, after a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over the USSR and its pilot, Gary Powers, was captured.

However, it is also important to recognize that Pakistan received substantial financial and military aid from the U.S. in return for its cooperation. Despite this, the U.S. continues to expect Pakistan to serve its strategic interests, often disregarding the impact on Pakistan’s own stability. This contradiction undermines Washington’s repeated assertions of supporting Pakistan’s stability and prosperity.

For example, in the past decade, Pakistan made two major strategic decisions: signing the multi-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement and handing over control of its key Gwadar seaport to China. While the U.S. has not openly opposed the CPEC, it has expressed dissatisfaction with China gaining operational control of Gwadar, viewing Beijing as a strategic competitor in the region. From Washington’s perspective, the CPEC strengthens China’s regional and global power, potentially at the expense of U.S. interests.

The CPEC is part of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at integrating the Eurasian landmass along the lines of the ancient Silk Road, with China reaping substantial economic benefits from this integration. Although the U.S. has strategic and economic rivalry with China, it should recognize that the CPEC could be a critical stabilizing factor for Pakistan, indirectly serving U.S. interests by promoting regional stability.

As the renowned strategist Hans Morgenthau suggested, every state must be willing to compromise on interests that are not vital. With this in mind, both U.S. and Pakistani decision-makers should consider each other’s core interests and avoid asking or expecting the other to compromise on matters of vital national importance.