Reports emerging from Afghanistan indicate serious rifts within the ranks of the Afghan Taliban, the ruling militia, while the main opposition militant group, the Afghan National Resistance Front (NRF), has announced plans to intensify its efforts against the Taliban regime.

According to sources, divisions have surfaced between the Kandhari group and the Haqqani Network, two key factions within the Afghan Taliban movement. The Kandhari group is led by Supreme Commander Haibatullah Akhunzada and Defence Minister Maulvi Yaqoob Mujahid, whereas the Haqqani Network is headed by Siraj Haqqani. Meanwhile, the NRF, which has been resisting the Taliban regime since its takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, has declared its intention to capitalize on these internal divisions. Led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud—who was assassinated in a suicide attack just before the 9/11 attacks—the NRF has urged all democratic forces to unite against the Taliban. Massoud has emphasized that merely waiting for internal Taliban disputes to weaken the regime would be a strategic mistake. Regardless of the specifics of these internal conflicts, they are likely to have a profound impact on Afghanistan’s future as a nation-state.

Since its establishment in 1747, Afghanistan has never been as fragile and unstable as it is today—not even during the Soviet occupation (1979–1988), the ensuing civil war, or the first Taliban regime (1996–2001). The extensive efforts by the U.S.-led international community to rebuild Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021—costing over a trillion dollars and resulting in the loss of nearly 5,000 troops—ultimately failed. Corruption and abuse of power under the quasi-elected governments of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani hindered Afghanistan’s development, fueling the Taliban insurgency despite the widespread initial support for their ouster in 2001.

Ironically, when international forces withdrew in 2021 and the Taliban swiftly regained power in Kabul, many Afghans welcomed their return, hoping they would focus on state-building after decades of resistance. However, after nearly three and a half years in power, the Taliban have failed to bring stability, let alone development. Despite ongoing financial assistance from the international community—driven by fears that cutting aid would push the regime back into drug trafficking—Afghanistan remains in turmoil.

Today, the life of an average Afghan citizen is worse than before, largely due to the Taliban regime’s rule. While the Afghan Taliban have yet to gain diplomatic recognition from any country except China, they also no longer face any known external enemies, unlike during their previous stint in power. However, instead of fostering strong international ties, the Taliban have even strained relations with their longest and most significant benefactor, Pakistan.

Since taking power, the Taliban regime has provided extensive logistical, financial, and military support to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan’s largest terrorist network. This backing has enabled the TTP to carry out relentless and large-scale attacks across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Rather than stabilizing Afghanistan, the Taliban’s rule over the past three and a half years has contributed to regional instability. Even the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have voiced concerns over the negative repercussions of Taliban governance. The inevitable consequence of these flawed policies is the emergence of internal rifts within the Taliban—an issue that is now becoming increasingly evident.

It is important to recognize that the Afghan Taliban originated as a non-state militia that seized power by force—first in 1996 and again in 2021. Crucially, their rise was not supported by any intellectual or political movement, meaning they lack the foundational structure to function as a legitimate state actor. Furthermore, their support base within Afghan society has always been limited. Most Afghans have remained indifferent to the group, largely because successive political parties and elected regimes failed to deliver. This has led to a complex love-hate relationship between the Afghan people and the Taliban. Given their lack of intellectual grounding and widespread popular support, it is unrealistic to expect the Taliban to govern effectively—something that has been evident over the past three years.

The most pressing concern now is what will happen if internal divisions within the Taliban escalate. With no true national political party or organized political movement in Afghanistan, the state may struggle to withstand such infighting, raising the real possibility of total chaos. The Taliban must work to prevent this scenario. However, as a militant group-turned-regime, they lack the political vision to navigate such challenges effectively.

The only viable path forward is for the Taliban to bring together Afghanistan’s political and social leadership to formulate a roadmap for the country’s future. This roadmap should include an interim setup to govern for a transitional period—perhaps a year—while key institutions such as the Election Commission and Judiciary are established. If the Taliban commit to this course of action, the international community may be willing to support them in stabilizing Afghanistan. Otherwise, the country faces an imminent collapse.