By all quantifiable measures, Bangladesh’s now deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was the most entrenched, dominant and brutal dictator the country had seen since its independence. She jailed, exiled and eliminated most of her political peers like no other ruler in South Asia’s history. She brought all the branches of the Bangladeshi state under her command with such great efficacy that at some point she became the state.

Yet, a leaderless movement of college students challenged her with marches with pre-announced dates and venues. In a matter of weeks, these young revolutionaries drew the nation with them into the streets to the point that Hasina had to catch a helicopter to flee. They achieved something that established political rivals of the former prime minister had tried for over a decade but failed consistently.

While the young revolutionaries and their supporters have much cause to celebrate, the road ahead for the country will not be without challenges.

In organising their protests, the students created a distributed co-leadership structure, where the leaders held the role of coordinators. They called their coalition the Students Against Discrimination movement. The coordinators came from both public and private educational institutions. What could have been quelled with some simple promises of future reforms was inflamed by crass comments by the prime minister and brutal suppression by her security forces. But the protest organisers were battle-tested and knew exactly what to expect.

Just like in 2024, in 2018 the youth were beaten mercilessly by Hasina’s civilian militia, that is, the student wing of the Awami League party. The use of violence managed to suppress the protests, but not before this generation of revolutionaries had gained enough experience in organising successful protests, creating alternative command structures, using improvised communication techniques under internet blockades and evading government surveillance, etc.

All of these skills helped them in their successful bid to oust the most ruthless dictator in Bangladesh’s history. Hasina has had to leave Bangladesh before. While she was residing in Europe, a bloody coup took place against her father, President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1975, which killed almost all of her family. She extended her stay abroad and only came back to the country in the early 1980s. She quickly gained prominence on the political scene and managed to create a cult-like following among the members of her father’s Awami League.

Following another military coup in 2006, both Hasina and her main political rival, Khaleda Zia, were about to lose their right to participate in politics in Bangladesh. Zia refused to go into exile and stayed in Bangladesh under house arrest. Hasina took the safe exit and spent time in Europe and the United States before returning to Bangladesh. She contested the 2008 election and won with a landslide.

But her triumphant return to power in 2008 is unlikely to be repeated. Given the massive bloodshed and indiscriminate killings that took place throughout her tenure, it will be extremely difficult for the 76-year-old Hasina to revive her political fortunes this time. General Waker Uz Zaman, the military chief who eventually asked Hasina to leave the country, happens to be a relative of hers through marriage. However, the possibility of a successful counter-coup to facilitate her return to Bangladesh is improbable at the moment, given the popular resentment towards her rule.

The fact that no other political figure of her stature had ever had to flee the country facing the rage of the people has permanently damaged Hasina’s reputation as an invincible leader. After all, she was chased away by hundreds of thousands of youths wielding sticks and bricks, while her men had all the guns and were shooting indiscriminately. This inglorious exit will make her future comeback politically untenable.

At the moment, student organisers are demanding Bangladeshi politics to be wiped clean of politicians associated with corruption and mismanagement, not just during Hasina’s rule but also in the governments that came before her. The trouble is that Hasina’s political DNA is found in every corner of the Bangladeshi state she left behind. Her hand-picked judges, bureaucrats, police and military commanders are still running the show. Making the new government acceptable to the people will require a messy process of administrative reshuffle, terminations and outright arrests of Hasina’s personnel, a process that has already begun.

During his first televised speech, General Zaman promised to bring justice to the victims of indiscriminate killings by the state apparatus during Hasina’s reign. Newly appointed advisers of the interim government echoed this intention. That accountability process, however, will certainly be lengthy and it is not clear if it can ever be completed under their watch. Reforming the police, civil bureaucracy and military command to restore people’s confidence in any future electoral process will also take time.

Dr Yunus also has to address various challenges in relations with Bangladesh’s two big neighbours: India and China. India, the country that was the chief defender of Hasina on the world stage, is both shocked and saddened by her departure. It has security concerns about the possible breakdown of law and order, and targeted repression of the large Bangladeshi Hindu population.

Hasina’s geopolitical chessboard was to counter American concerns on human rights by addressing India’s security fears and engaging with China’s business interests. Now, the future government may be busy blunting Indian security concerns by delivering on the Americans’ anxieties about China. Orchestrating this geopolitical dance will benefit from the broad international acceptance that Dr Yunus brings, but execution and delivery may still be difficult.

The main task for the interim government remains organising a new general election. Demands for a tribunal to prosecute thousands of illegal deaths and gross human rights violations either locally or internationally may make things complicated for the Awami League’s participation in a future national election. The party itself may also predicate its future electoral participation on conditions favouring a return of Hasina’s clan, if not Hasina herself.

There is exuberance and hope for a better future everywhere. But optimism should be cautious. Whether this latest revolution enshrines a fairer, freer, less brutal and democratic Bangladesh depends on the practicality of the demands placed by the revolutionaries and the dexterity of the new administration, regarding not only managing them but also addressing pressures from external forces.