The air raids conducted by the Pakistan military inside Afghanistan on February 22, which reportedly killed 70 suspected militants, have further strained already fragile relations between Islamabad and Kabul. However, following a recent spate of deadly attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) by Afghanistan-based militant outfits, the strikes appeared increasingly unavoidable from Pakistan’s security perspective.
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) carried out operations in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Paktika provinces, close to the Pakistan border. Islamabad stated that the targets were hideouts of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which the government now refers to as Fitna-tul-Khawarij. In contrast, the Afghan Taliban administration claimed that civilians, including women and children, were killed in the strikes. The Taliban authorities also warned Pakistan of an “appropriate response” to what they described as violations of Afghan sovereignty.
Significantly, Pakistan also announced that the PAF targeted hideouts of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), the regional affiliate of the transnational militant group Islamic State (IS). IS-K had claimed responsibility for a recent attack on an imambargah in Islamabad that killed 31 worshippers. The Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, have been engaged in ongoing clashes with IS-K inside Afghanistan due to ideological and political rivalries. Ironically, in recent months the Afghan Taliban leadership has accused Pakistan of harbouring IS-K elements to destabilise Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strikes on IS-K positions following attacks inside its own territory therefore challenge that narrative.
A critical question arises: are Pakistani strikes against militant hideouts inside Afghanistan inevitable and justified? From Islamabad’s standpoint, they appear increasingly inevitable. Pakistan has repeatedly urged Kabul to rein in TTP elements operating from Afghan soil and launching attacks across the border. However, Afghan authorities have largely rejected these accusations, instead advising Pakistan to address its internal security challenges and even suggesting renewed dialogue with the TTP. Meanwhile, cross-border attacks have continued.
Since returning to power in August 2021 after the collapse of the government of Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan Taliban have exercised control over most of Afghanistan’s territory. During this period, Pakistan has accused them of providing space, sanctuary, or at least tolerance to TTP fighters. The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP is shaped by historical, ideological, and operational ties. The TTP has pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban’s supreme leader in the past and reportedly fought alongside the Afghan Taliban during their insurgency against US-NATO forces and successive Afghan governments. The TTP has also engaged IS-K militants within Afghanistan, aligning tactically with the Afghan Taliban against a common adversary.
From a broader historical perspective, tensions between Kabul and Islamabad predate the current Taliban administration. Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, successive Afghan governments have had disputes with Islamabad over border recognition and Pashtun nationalist claims. In the 1970s, Afghan President Sardar Daud Khan supported anti-Pakistan elements, and in later decades various Afghan regimes were accused by Islamabad of harbouring militant groups hostile to Pakistan. Against this backdrop, Pakistani policymakers view the current TTP presence in Afghanistan as part of a longer pattern of cross-border insecurity.
From the Pakistani security establishment’s viewpoint, air strikes against militant infrastructure inside Afghanistan are framed as acts of self-defence against non-state actors using foreign territory to conduct attacks. Islamabad argues that when repeated diplomatic engagement fails and cross-border violence persists, limited kinetic action becomes a last resort.
At the same time, the situation exposes strategic miscalculations on multiple sides. For decades, Pakistan supported the Afghan Taliban, viewing them as a force that could secure friendly influence in Kabul and prevent Afghan territory from being used against Pakistan. The Taliban movement itself emerged in the mid-1990s and maintained longstanding links with Pakistan. Islamabad also played a significant diplomatic role during negotiations that preceded the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
However, expectations that the Afghan Taliban would fully accommodate Pakistan’s security concerns have not materialised as anticipated. The Taliban leadership, now acting as a governing authority, appears guided by its own ideological commitments, internal political dynamics, and Afghan nationalist considerations. This has created friction in bilateral relations, particularly over the TTP issue.
It is also important to recognise that continued cross-border strikes carry risks. They heighten diplomatic tensions, complicate regional stability, and may provoke retaliatory rhetoric or actions. Civilian casualty claims — whether verified or disputed — further inflame public opinion and deepen mistrust between the two countries.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s leadership views such operations as a compulsion driven by national security imperatives. Yet long-term stability cannot be secured through air power alone. Sustainable peace along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border will require sustained diplomatic engagement, credible counterterrorism cooperation, border management mechanisms, and mutual recognition of each other’s security concerns.
The February 22 strikes therefore reflect not only an immediate tactical response to militant violence, but also a deeper strategic dilemma: how to manage a complex and historically fraught relationship where security, ideology, history, and geography intersect. Without a coordinated framework to address cross-border militancy, cycles of accusation and retaliation are likely to persist — to the detriment of both countries and the wider region.