Relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, who currently govern Afghanistan, show no signs of improvement. Tensions have escalated as senior officials of the Taliban regime recently stated unequivocally that Kabul cannot prevent terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based groups operating from Afghan soil.

The Afghan Taliban’s support for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the largest terrorist network targeting Pakistan, remains the primary point of contention. While the Taliban, under their Emirate-e-Islami-Afghanistan (EIA), deny supporting the TTP despite acknowledging its presence in Afghanistan, they have failed to take concrete action to stop the group’s attacks on Pakistan.

A recent statement by the Afghan Chargé d’Affaires in Islamabad, claiming that the Taliban regime cannot stop terrorist attacks in Pakistan, underscores Kabul’s inability—or unwillingness—to curb the TTP. This suggests that the Afghan authorities are either powerless to act against the TTP or are deliberately choosing not to, further straining bilateral relations. Against this backdrop, prospects for improved ties between the two sides remain bleak.

The diplomatic rift deepened following an incident in September where Afghan Consul General Mohibullah Shakir disrespected Pakistan’s national anthem during an event in Peshawar. At a Rahmat-ul-lil-Aalameen Conference, hosted by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, Shakir remained seated during Pakistan’s national anthem, blatantly violating diplomatic norms. The act prompted official condemnation from Pakistan, with a Foreign Office spokesperson stating, “We are conveying our strong protest to the Afghan authorities both in Islamabad and Kabul.” Incidents like this add fuel to the already volatile relationship between the two neighbors.

At the close of 2024, relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are at a historic low. Last year, Pakistan made it clear that Kabul must choose between maintaining friendly ties or continuing to harbor and protect the TTP. Since its formation in 2007, the TTP has waged war against the Pakistani state. However, after a major military operation launched in response to the December 16, 2014, Peshawar school attack, most of the TTP leadership relocated to Afghanistan. From there, the group provided support to the Afghan Taliban in their fight against the now-defunct Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and U.S.-led international forces. For the Afghan Taliban, the TTP remains a strategic asset, making it nearly impossible for them to sever ties or take action against the group.

Recent months have seen a sharp increase in terrorist attacks across Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, with the TTP claiming responsibility for many of these incidents. Hundreds of lives have been lost, and Pakistan squarely blames the Afghan Taliban for these attacks, urging them to prevent the use of Afghan territory for cross-border terrorism.

With Pakistan’s firm and justified stance, its relations with the Afghan Taliban have reached a critical low. Islamabad has accused Kabul of knowing the locations of TTP hideouts in Afghanistan and deliberately choosing not to act against them. Pakistan now appears determined to prioritize its national interests over appeasement, signaling that its patience has run out. The TTP has been the state’s top enemy for the past 15 years, and any country that supports it cannot be considered a friend of Pakistan.

The Afghan Taliban have been hosting and nurturing the TTP on Afghan soil due to their vested strategic interests. As mentioned earlier, the TTP has supported the Afghan Taliban in their battles against Afghan state forces, rival militant groups, and international forces within Afghanistan. For the Afghan Taliban, the TTP is of immense strategic value, making them unwilling to compromise on their relationship with the group.

Ironically, the Pakistani state has historically supported the Afghan Taliban, playing a key role in their resurgence and eventual takeover of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s backing was driven by the expectation that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would maintain friendly relations with Islamabad. However, since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Pakistan’s hopes of resolving longstanding animosity have not materialized. Instead, tensions have worsened, which has been a sobering realization for Islamabad.

This situation underscores a critical lesson: Pakistan’s policy of relying on the Afghan Taliban to fulfill its strategic objectives has failed. A thorough reassessment of this approach is urgently needed. The expectation that the Afghan Taliban would address Pakistan’s security concerns has proven misguided. Relying on a militant non-state actor, regardless of how aligned its interests may appear, is inherently flawed. Such groups are unpredictable and, over time, can turn against their benefactors.

Since their second rise to power, the Afghan Taliban have adopted a more nationalist and religious posture. Their support for the TTP appears to be influenced not only by strategic concerns but also by historical Afghan irredentist claims over Pashtun-majority areas in Pakistan. Lacking political legitimacy within Afghanistan—having seized power through force rather than democratic means—the Taliban rely heavily on fostering anti-Pakistan sentiments to rally public support. This strategy mirrors the approach of past Afghan rulers, both elected and unelected, who often used anti-Pakistan rhetoric to legitimize their regimes.

For Pakistan, this shift in Afghan Taliban behavior has necessitated a reevaluation of its Afghanistan policy. This reassessment, while delayed, is a crucial step. The Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP is not simply a tactic to pressure Pakistan or extract concessions. Instead, it increasingly appears to be part of a broader, dangerous strategy to use the TTP as a tool to incite a separatist Pashtun nationalist movement in Pakistan.

This strategy poses a significant threat to Pakistan’s stability. It highlights the Taliban’s willingness to exploit ethno-nationalist sentiments against a neighboring state. Unfortunately, Pakistani decision-makers may not have fully accounted for this dimension of the Afghan Taliban’s actions. This is not just about exerting pressure on Pakistan but a calculated move with potentially far-reaching consequences for the region.

Pakistan’s policymakers must consider this aspect seriously when formulating and adjusting their Afghanistan strategy. The assumption that the Afghan Taliban would remain amicable allies has proven false. Moving forward, Pakistan must adopt a more pragmatic and clear-eyed approach, ensuring its policies prioritize its sovereignty, security, and national interests over reliance on militant groups.