Recently, the government of Pakistan announced the launch of a new counterterrorism operation, codenamed Azm-i-Isthikam. The government vowed to use all state resources, including military, diplomatic, legislative, and socio-economic tools, to decisively defeat terrorism and extremism.

This announcement followed a meeting of the Central Apex Committee of the National Action Plan (NAP), chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and attended by key federal ministers, provincial chief ministers, the chiefs of the three military services, and top civilian bureaucrats. Reportedly, concerns were raised during the meeting regarding the implementation of various points of the NAP.

The NAP was framed by the entire political leadership of Pakistan after the heinous Army Public School terrorist attack in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. It aimed to counter extremism and terrorism in the country and included 20 points. The significance of the NAP was its unequivocal commitment to eliminating the scourge of terrorism in all its forms from Pakistan. It prescribed efforts at political, diplomatic, security, economic, and social levels. Undoubtedly, the strategy against terrorism must be all-encompassing, incorporating political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions, as mere military operations are not a complete solution.

In the current political crisis in the country, such an operation could be counterproductive and potentially exacerbate the crisis. Therefore, instead of launching a new offensive, the best option for the state would be to revive and implement the National Action Plan of 2015 to counter extremism and terrorism in the country effectively.

Unfortunately, the NAP could not be implemented in letter and spirit and, more importantly, holistically. However, even the implementation of some points or aspects of the NAP worked wonders to counter extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. For instance, two important points of the NAP—the execution of convicted terrorists and the formation of speedy courts to try those accused of terrorism—were nearly fully implemented.

The NAP point regarding ensuring that no armed militia could function in the country needed a holistic policy, as mere declarations were insufficient. This policy must combine outlawing militias, taking effective legal action against them, and using military and police force to physically and forcefully stop these militias from operating. Moreover, the strategy must combine physical, psychological, and economic measures to stop armed militias from operating. Unfortunately, there has been no effective implementation in this regard.

Strengthening the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was required under the NAP. Unfortunately, this could not be done for various reasons.

The fifth point of the NAP regarding countering hate speech and extremist material requires courageous steps from the government. It must ruthlessly and indiscriminately enforce the existing ban on using loudspeakers installed in mosques for purposes other than the call to prayer (Azan). Moreover, the government must crack down on all published and broadcast materials and internet sites through which extremists and terrorists carry out their propaganda and gain recruits, finances, and sympathizers. Unfortunately, the authorities have failed to enforce this provision.

The NAP also calls for choking the financial resources of terrorists. In this regard, government agencies must identify the large business complexes that extremist and terrorist groups have established as their main sources of financing. The government must also end unofficial Hundi and Hawala methods of money transactions. Some progress has been made, but much more needs to be done. While the government has addressed this to a great extent, it has done so not under the NAP but under pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which kept Pakistan on its grey list for years.

The next point of the NAP calls for ensuring that proscribed organizations do not re-emerge. This is fundamentally a matter of the government’s commitment to its own counterterrorism goals. It is well-known how banned organizations have re-emerged under new names. For instance, the state’s policy of negotiating with the TTP was a clear violation of this provision of the NAP. This gave the TTP a reason to regroup, resurge, and once again pose a grave threat to the country. Although the state has now admitted that talking to the TTP was a mistake, this admission alone does not rectify the situation.

The most important point of the NAP is the registration and regulation of madrassas. Given their physical presence, historic contribution to religious extremism and terrorism, and the ineffably gruesome Peshawar carnage, regulating and registering madrassas should have been straightforward. However, successive governments, including the PML-N, PTI, the previous 13-party alliance led by the PML-N, and the current PML-PPP government, have failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Moving forward, regulating madrassas without fearing political or public backlash is essential.

The NAP point about carrying out administrative and developmental reforms in the erstwhile FATA, with an immediate focus on the return of IDPs, is of extreme significance. Although FATA has been merged with K-P, this step has led to more conflicts. This situation needs to be addressed seriously; otherwise, the continued crisis and conflict in the former tribal areas will continue to fuel extremism and terrorism across Pakistan. If the merger is not working, alternative arrangements should be considered.

The 15th point of the NAP, which emphasizes zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab, is fundamentally significant. Historically, the PML-N has had strong linkages with banned extremist and terrorist organizations, using them to secure votes and parliamentary seats.

The point regarding the formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with the registration of all unregistered illegal refugees, is also extremely significant. However, the logic behind registering illegally staying Afghans is questionable. These individuals need to be deported without further delay, as the state has no other viable option.