Terrorists have once again launched attacks in the southern parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Recent incidents include several low-intensity attacks and the assassination of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Sami faction (JUI-S) leader Maulana Hamidul Haq. A major attack in Bannu on March 4 resulted in the martyrdom of 13 civilians and five security personnel. Sixteen terrorists, including several suicide attackers, were killed in the Bannu assault. The attacks were high-profile acts of terrorism.
The scale of the Bannu attack, involving multiple suicide attackers, highlights the resources available to the terrorist groups. Reports suggest the attack was allegedly carried out by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, based in the neighboring tribal district of North Waziristan. Led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, this group was previously labeled as ‘good’ Taliban due to their focus on Afghanistan rather than attacks within Pakistan, particularly during the US-NATO occupation from 2001 to 2021. Since the Afghan Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021, most members of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group relocated there and have received support from the Afghan Taliban regime. The group fled to Afghanistan following Pakistan military operations like Radul Fassad, launched after the December 16, 2014, Peshawar school massacre.
The Bannu attack must also be viewed within the broader context of the Afghan Taliban regime’s ongoing support for Pakistani terrorist groups, especially the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. Although structurally and administratively distinct, both groups receive consistent backing from the Afghan Taliban. The reasons behind this support are crucial to understand.
Firstly, the Afghan Taliban view Pakistan as an adversary, despite their public rhetoric. Secondly, they see groups like the TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur as strategic allies and natural extensions of their own militant ideology. The Afghan Taliban, a non-state militant group that seized power in Afghanistan, recognize their rule as illegitimate without free and fair elections. As holding such elections would undermine their grip on power, they rely on these Pakistani militant groups — who share ethnic roots (Pashtun) and a militant worldview — to counter non-Taliban resistance forces. Notably, Ahmad Massoud, son of the legendary anti-Soviet fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, has already organized the National Resistance Front (NRF) and is preparing for an armed movement against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Lastly, the Afghan Taliban’s support for Pakistani terrorist groups also serves their strategic aim of delegitimizing the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly targeting Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This tactic fuels instability in the region and strengthens their influence over militant factions operating on both sides of the border.
Historically, no Afghan regime, including the current and previous Taliban governments, has recognized the legitimacy of the 2,640-kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, established in 1893. It is unsurprising that Pakistani Taliban groups also reject the border, dismissing it as “imaginary.”
Given Afghanistan’s long-standing hostility toward Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty, this situation was always expected. The Afghan Taliban refuse to acknowledge the international border, and their Pakistani allies, such as the TTP, echo this stance. More concerning, however, is the position of certain political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), like the JUI-F and ANP, which indirectly question the border’s legitimacy. JUI-F chief Maulana Fazl and ANP leader Aimal Wali have repeatedly called Afghans and Pakhtuns “one nation.” While the JUI-F opposed the merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (now merged into KP), the ANP—despite supporting the merger—has aggressively criticized Pakistan’s recent decision to repatriate millions of Afghan nationals living in the country.
Aimal Wali went as far as to suggest that if Pakistan expels Afghan refugees, it should also repatriate those who migrated from India at the time of Pakistan’s creation. This argument is baseless, as the migration of Urdu-speaking people from India occurred under an agreed-upon partition plan involving all major political leaders and the British rulers. Ironically, Aimal Wali and his family, including his father, Asfandyar Wali, and grandfather, Abdul Wali Khan, have historically maintained that Afghanistan is a separate state and that Pakistan should not interfere in its affairs. Yet today, he defends millions of Afghan refugees as if they are Pakistan’s responsibility—despite the immense social and economic burden they have placed on KP’s local population.
Following the Bannu attack, Pakistan confirmed through intelligence reports that Afghan nationals were physically involved, with evidence indicating that the attack was orchestrated by “khawarij” leaders operating from Afghan soil. Pakistan has rightfully demanded that the Afghan Taliban prevent their territory from being used for terrorism against Pakistan, warning that Islamabad reserves the right to take necessary action.
Pakistan is fully justified in defending itself, including carrying out preemptive strikes against terrorist sanctuaries inside Afghanistan if Kabul refuses to act. Moreover, Pakistan must accelerate the repatriation of millions of Afghan nationals without further delay. After securing the border with fencing, this would be the next crucial step to safeguard national security and stability.