The coalition government of Pakistan has successfully passed the 26th Constitutional Amendment, allowing it to establish a Constitutional Bench and appoint a judge of its choice as head of the bench. Additionally, the coalition and key power-brokers have enacted legislation extending the tenure of armed forces chiefs from three to five years. With the 26th Amendment and further legislative changes, including amendments to the Supreme Court Practice and Procedure Act, the coalition government, led by Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, now exercises substantial control over judicial proceedings, potentially influencing judgments from the higher judiciary.

Notably, the newly appointed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Yahya Afridi, along with senior judges Justice Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Muneeb Akhtar, and others outside the seven-member Constitutional Bench, now have limited influence in constitutional matters. This raises serious concerns about the independence and role of the Supreme Court as the highest constitutional authority, as established by Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution. Many analysts suggest that the Supreme Court’s role has been significantly undermined. Thus, the coalition government—comprising the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), and Awami National Party (ANP)—in partnership with influential power-brokers, has achieved its goals, but at a potential cost to the integrity and function of state institutions.

The motivations behind this constitutional amendment and anticipated future legislation seem to be centered on securing the continuity of the current political setup, which critics argue lacks democratic foundations. Power-brokers claim that the current setup is essential for Pakistan’s political and economic stability. However, recent events suggest that stability remains elusive; the amendment and recent legislation have arguably contributed to increased political and economic instability. For example, the privatization of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) highlighted these challenges. Despite expectations of a minimum bid of Rs. 80 billion, only one bidder participated, offering a mere Rs. 10 billion. This example underscores the coalition government’s struggle to generate confidence in its continuity and ability to foster genuine stability.

Many within the current coalition government believe that the populist and adversarial politics of former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), is the primary cause of instability in Pakistan. While there may be some truth to this claim, a more pressing question remains: can the PTI alone truly destabilize the state? Despite receiving significant support in the disputed February 2024 elections, which ultimately brought the coalition led by Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif to power, it’s unlikely that the PTI alone is the main destabilizing force. For instance, the separatist insurgency in Balochistan, where groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) operate, is a major crisis that has severely undermined the state’s authority over a region comprising 42% of Pakistan’s land area. The PTI has no significant support or influence among the Baloch population, making it clear that the instability in Balochistan has causes beyond PTI’s actions.

Similarly, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), a province led by the PTI for a third consecutive term, faces challenges with insecurity and terrorism. Given the PTI’s popularity and governance in the province, it seems contradictory to argue that it is responsible for the instability there. Thus, the coalition’s assertion that the PTI is solely responsible for Pakistan’s political and economic instability lacks strong support.

However, the PTI’s own response to the political crisis has been inconsistent. Its leadership’s hesitation in how to oppose the coalition’s agenda has weakened its stance. For instance, the PTI organized rallies and marches to pressure the government against passing the 26th Constitutional Amendment and to demand Imran Khan’s release. But just when these protests appeared to be gaining momentum, PTI’s leadership backed down, leaving their efforts ineffective. The PTI now faces a critical choice: if Imran Khan believes he has the public’s unwavering support to disrupt the current government, he may choose to mobilize his supporters. If he doubts this, he might consider negotiating his release from jail, restructuring his party, and preparing for future political engagement. The current strategy of agitation and rhetoric without decisive action risks further destabilizing the state. Allowing the coalition to operate could be advantageous; if it fails to deliver promised foreign investment and reforms, Khan will have a stronger platform to rally public support.

One striking aspect of the ongoing political crisis is the exposure of Pakistan’s state institutions, including the judiciary. Today, even ordinary citizens recognize that the system functions not in their interests, but for those in power. The cycle of influence continues: those in positions of authority are perpetually aligned with politicians from varying backgrounds and parties. Presently, the PML-N, PPP, MQM, BAP, and ANP are allied with the establishment, just as the PTI had previously been in power under similar alliances. For instance, it was the PTI that initially extended the term of former Army Chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, which now complicates its position when criticizing similar moves by the current government.