Addressing the security issues in KP and Balochistan: Challenges and the path forward

The recent wave of attacks, including the assault on Jaffar Express across Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provinces, has claimed the lives of dozens of security personnel and civilians, shaking the entire country. These incidents underscore the urgent need for the state to formulate a comprehensive policy and introduce changes to existing counterterrorism measures.
Over the past few days, multiple terrorist attacks have occurred, with the most significant and deadly being the attack on Jaffar Express and the security forces’ convoy in Balochistan’s Noshki district. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist militant group advocating for the secession of Pakistan’s largest province, Balochistan, claimed responsibility for both attacks. The Jaffar Express was traveling from Quetta, the provincial capital, to Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, when it was targeted. While the BLA initially claimed to have killed numerous passengers, these assertions remain unverified. Security forces later launched an operation and reported the successful rescue of over 100 individuals.
The gravity of the situation is evident in the statement of opposition leader in the National Assembly, Gohar Ayub Khan of the PTI, who is also the grandson of Pakistan’s first military dictator, General Ayub Khan. He warned that Balochistan’s security situation is dire, with eight out of 37 districts completely beyond state control. Other political leaders, including JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman and provincial assembly members from Balochistan, have echoed concerns that large swathes of the province are under the influence of militant groups like the BLA, a deeply alarming reality for the country.
Simultaneously, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has escalated its attacks in KP, particularly in the southern districts of Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. The situation in both Balochistan and KP has become so volatile that authorities have imposed curfews in various terror-affected regions. Additionally, the provincial government in Balochistan has shut down Balochistan University in Quetta and the University of Turbat due to security concerns.
In response to these developments, the federal government convened a special meeting of the National Security Committee (NSC), attended by provincial chief ministers and senior military leadership. Selected members of the National Assembly and Senate also participated, leading to key decisions, including the launch of stringent military offensives against terrorists, with a firm resolve that no militant will be spared. However, the decision of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)—the country’s most popular party—not to participate in the NSC meeting, citing restrictions on consulting its jailed founder, Imran Khan, somewhat diminished the meeting’s impact. The PTI, which governs KP, has expressed reservations about military operations, insisting that local stakeholders be taken into confidence before any action is initiated.
Launching new counterterrorism operations without the support of the largest political party could create significant challenges for their success. This issue must be addressed by the authorities before moving forward with the offensives. Furthermore, while the PTI has expressed reluctance toward new military actions, the majority of people in KP’s terror-affected districts remain strongly opposed to fresh operations, further complicating the situation.
All political parties, despite their ideological and other differences, have united in the southern districts of KP and the northern Malakand Division under the banner of ‘Pasoon’ (Public Uprising), collectively rejecting any new military offensives. Their stance is rooted in the belief that over the past two decades, several large and small anti-terror operations were conducted in these regions. While these offensives brought temporary peace between 2017 and 2022, terrorism has since resurged with even greater intensity. Therefore, they argue that military operations are not a long-term solution to the menace of terrorism.
Given the public opposition to military offensives in KP, conducting them successfully would be highly challenging. Perhaps recognizing this reality, the federal government later clarified after the NSC meeting that no fresh large-scale operations would be launched. Instead, ongoing Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) would be made more comprehensive and effective. However, the question of military action in Balochistan remains far more complex.
Firstly, the provincial government, led by Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti, lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many. Not only is his leadership questioned, but the entire electoral process of February 2024 in Balochistan has been widely criticized, making the provincial government’s authority highly contentious. As a result, all major security decisions concerning Balochistan have been, and will continue to be, made by the federal government or other powerful state institutions. The key challenge now is how to effectively address the grave national security threat posed in the province.
There is no doubt that the BLA is a terrorist organization, and its acts of violence—targeting security forces and civilians, even those from other provinces—are unjustifiable and condemnable. However, while the people of Balochistan may not actively support the BLA or other militant groups, it is also a stark reality that they do not align themselves with the state of Pakistan either. This sentiment of alienation has been exploited by groups like the BLA in recent years, allowing them to justify their insurgency. These groups, under the guise of representing the common Baloch, are in fact serving the interests of external actors such as India and Afghanistan, both of whom seek to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and, on a broader scale, fuel separatist movements within Pakistan.
Given these dynamics, any action taken in Balochistan must be extremely cautious and strategic. The state must work towards gaining the trust and support of as many Baloch leaders as possible—whether they are politicians, businesspeople, teachers, lawyers, or civil society activists. However, this cannot be achieved through empty promises of development and constitutional rights alone. The state must make substantial commitments, including granting near-total control of CPEC projects, Gwadar’s development, and the Reko Diq mining project to the people of Balochistan. Additionally, ensuring employment opportunities for Baloch youth is crucial. The federal government should prioritize hiring educated young men and women from Balochistan, either in federal departments or, if not feasible, in provincial government roles. A significant step would be earmarking a dedicated job quota for Baloch youth in other provinces, particularly Punjab, to help alleviate their longstanding grievances of neglect and deprivation.
KP and Balochistan represent the future of Pakistan. If their people remain dissatisfied and feel disconnected from the state, achieving long-term stability and national development will be exceedingly difficult.