In recent months, the Afghan Taliban regime has taken some tentative steps toward addressing the threat posed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—the largest Pakistani terrorist network—in a bid to improve ties with Islamabad. In response, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar announced that Islamabad would upgrade its diplomatic relations with Kabul by elevating its chargé d’affaires at the Pakistan Embassy in Afghanistan to the rank of full ambassador.

This warming of relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban regime is a positive sign for peace, stability, and regional harmony—not only for both countries but also for the broader South and Central Asian regions. Historically, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained tense since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. Afghanistan, a much older nation, was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, citing that Pakistan was in possession of large tracts of territory—particularly much of present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and parts of Balochistan—that it claimed were historically part of Afghanistan but were annexed by British colonial rulers.

This longstanding irredentist claim by Afghanistan has been a persistent source of mistrust and conflict. In recent years, the most pressing issue has been the Afghan Taliban regime’s tacit support for the TTP, which has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Pakistan since its emergence in 2007. Following Pakistan’s large-scale military operations in the tribal regions in 2014—launched in the aftermath of the horrific Army Public School attack in Peshawar—many TTP militants fled across the border into Afghanistan.

A key reason behind the Afghan Taliban’s support for the TTP appears to be their continued belief in Afghanistan’s territorial claims over parts of Pakistan. In the Taliban’s strategic calculus, the TTP could potentially serve as leverage to pressure Pakistan into negotiations over the status of the tribal regions. This may explain Pakistan’s decision to merge the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the 25th Constitutional Amendment in 2018—an attempt to fully integrate the region and put an end to Afghanistan’s historical claims.

When this merger was enacted, then-Afghan President Ashraf Ghani publicly objected, and former President Hamid Karzai also raised concerns, calling the status of both KP and FATA “controversial.” Ironically, some Pakistani political figures, most notably Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), opposed the merger on similar grounds. Fazlur Rehman has repeatedly argued that the tribal areas should retain their “separate and distinct” status—an argument that inadvertently aligns with the Afghan irredentist narrative.

Against this backdrop, the recent shift in the Afghan Taliban’s stance toward the TTP is a cautiously encouraging development. While the Taliban have yet to take firm action against the TTP, they have recently begun to discourage attacks on Pakistani soil. In late May, senior Afghan Taliban commander Saeedullah Saeed warned militant factions against unauthorized jihad—especially in Pakistan—stating such actions were contrary to Shariah and to the directives of the Islamic Emirate’s leadership.

In his remarks quoted by the media, senior Afghan Taliban commander Saeedullah Saeed stated: “Joining various groups to wage jihad abroad does not make one a true mujahid… Only the Amir of the state has the authority to declare jihad—not individuals or groups.” He further emphasized that those who carry out attacks independently or move across regions to conduct operations cannot be considered legitimate fighters under Islamic law. “Jihad based on personal ego or group loyalty is considered fasad (corruption), not legitimate resistance,” he asserted.

Saeedullah’s statement is both timely and rational. However, the real question remains: to what extent is the Afghan Taliban regime willing—and able—to enforce this position?

Amid continued tensions between Pakistan and India, Islamabad and Kabul quietly began working toward a rapprochement. This resulted in a series of confidence-building measures, including, for the first time, action by the Afghan Taliban regime against militant groups, including the TTP, operating from Afghan soil and encouraging cross-border attacks into Pakistan.

Given that the TTP has long enjoyed safe haven and ideological alignment with the Afghan Taliban, this sudden shift raises important questions. What prompted this apparent change of heart? The most compelling explanation is the Afghan Taliban’s growing frustration over its continued lack of international recognition and financial assistance. In this context, Pakistan’s support remains critical.

Despite Pakistan’s decades-long backing of the Taliban—from their emergence in 1994, to their first takeover of Kabul in 1996, and later throughout their insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition—the Taliban have repeatedly taken positions counter to Pakistan’s interests, most notably their support for the TTP. Now, faced with international isolation and mounting domestic challenges, the Afghan Taliban are finding themselves with few viable options and are compelled to seek improved relations with Islamabad.

One major factor driving this urgency is Pakistan’s recent and resolute decision to repatriate over four million Afghan nationals living in the country. This move strikes at the heart of Afghanistan’s fragile economy, as the remittances and informal support from these Afghans represent a financial lifeline for many households. Repatriation would not only be a humanitarian and economic strain on Afghanistan but also a considerable logistical and administrative burden.

However, for Pakistan—particularly the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan—hosting millions of Afghan refugees has become an unsustainable strain, both economically and in terms of internal security. It is imperative that Pakistan’s decision to repatriate undocumented Afghans is not compromised in exchange for superficial gestures by the Taliban regarding the TTP.

Islamabad may welcome recent moves by the Afghan Taliban as positive signals, but it must not treat them as a quid pro quo for pausing the repatriation process. Pakistan’s leadership must navigate this situation with strategic foresight, ensuring that national interests remain the top priority.

While economic and diplomatic pressure may have motivated the Afghan Taliban’s latest gestures, the influence of China must also be acknowledged. Chinese diplomatic efforts have been instrumental in bringing Pakistan and Afghanistan to the table. On May 21, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted an unannounced trilateral meeting with the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Beijing. Following the meeting, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that both countries had agreed, in principle, to upgrade their diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

China’s interest in regional stability stems from its massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which hinge on reliable inter- and intra-regional connectivity. Continued political instability in Afghanistan threatens these projects and remains a key concern for Beijing.

While China may facilitate dialogue, Pakistan must remain clear-eyed. Engagement with the Afghan Taliban must be guided by a firm commitment to national security, long-term regional stability, and strategic interests—rather than short-term diplomatic optics or external pressure.