Baloch armed groups have become more radicalized and gruesome as indicated by the number, intensity and nature of their terrorist and militant attacks, while the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has forged an alliance with them to put a grave challenge to the state. Ironically, the state apparatus has failed to come up with an appropriate response to address the key issues of the province and genuine demands of the predominant majority of common Balochs. Addressing the main problems of Balochs is critically important for the state to deny space to militant-terrorist groups to sell their narrative to the common people.

Insofar as the radicalization of Baloch armed separatist groups is concerned, this can be gauged from the tactic of suicide bombing. Last April, a female suicide bomber belonging to the Majeed Brigade of Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) had carried out a suicide attack on Chinese language teachers killing three of them along with one other in University of Karachi. The attacker was later identified as Shari Baloch, a married young woman. Only days before that a completely new group, Balochistan National Army (BNA), conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) blast in the Anarkali Bazaar of Lahore, killing three. The aim of the Karachi suicide attack was to clarify the goals of Baloch separatists to everyone. As the attack was made on Chinese nationals the strike was aimed at conveying a message to Beijing that Baloch separatists disapproved of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects in Balochistan and wanted China to put an end to them, because the projects were finalized and executed without the agreement of common Baloch and their genuine leadership, a reference to armed Baloch separatist groups.

The Lahore attack aimed at displaying that Baloch separatists had the wherewithal to conduct terrorist attacks outside Balochistan even in downtown Lahore, the cultural capital of Pakistan. The growing radicalization of the Baloch armed separatist group is mainly because of their alliance with the TTP, the most ruthless and lethal terrorist group of Pakistan history, mostly comprising Pashtuns from the tribal belt of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Suicide attacks in Pakistan were introduced and mastered by the TTP. According to the TTP and Baloch separatist groups, last year they forged an alliance to coordinate attacks and to make best use of their resources, its reflection is very much obvious among terrorist-militant groups of Balochistan. There has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks by Baloch secessionist outfits and their lethality over the last two years. The trend continues in 2023. For instance, a militant attack on January 18 from across the Iranian side of the border between the two countries had martyred four soldiers. The attack took place in the remote Panjgur district in southwestern Balochistan, the Pakistan military said in a statement. “The terrorists used Iranian soil to target a convoy of security forces patrolling along the border,” the statement added.

All these incidents show the situation in Balochistan has become increasingly bad. For this situation we are ourselves responsible. As a society and state, we have let the conditions in Balochistan deteriorate to such an extent that now it is a popular demand in the province that the Baloch must be given their right to determine their future. Although many may disagree with the argument and would like to counter-argue that it is only the perception and wish of the few that Balochis as a whole want to exercise their right to self-determination. However, irrespective of our perceptions and wishes, the objective reality, instead of constructed reality, is that in Balochistan the movement for determining the future of the province by its inhabitants is extremely strong.

Denying something does not mean that a phenomenon does not exist. Today no one can deny the fact that there have been grave human rights violations in Balochistan and this can be gauged from reports of Pakistani organizations like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) on the conflict and province. In Balochistan the reality is out for everyone to see and whoever would go and experience and observe the conditions and sentiments of Balochis he or she would come to the conclusion that everyone in Balochistan would like to determine his or her and the province’s future. We all Pakistanis in particular the decision-making institutions and the executive authority must understand and then decide the future course of action in the light of the understanding. Otherwise, the situation would go totally out of hand in Balochistan and then the Pakistani state will have no role, whatsoever, in the future of the region.

The best strategy for the Pakistani state and the government in Balochistan is not to have a uni-focal approach of trying to take out armed terrorists through military action. Yes military action is necessary to contain armed militias from being effective and growing in size and form but this is not the solution.

The second best option in the devising of a realistic and viable strategy to end the conflict in Balochistan would be to start negotiating with the genuine Baloch leadership and political parties including the armed groups. If talks could be held with the TTP why not Baloch terrorists? Obviously, the state would use these parleys to open a door for peaceful resolution of the conflict, not to compromise on its basic principle of national integrity. Such talks are going to create rifts within hardcore and malleable Baloch armed groups. The present provincial government cannot claim to be the genuine representative of the people of Balochistan. There are many genuine political forces. There are other groups which must also be engaged in talks like the Jambori Watan Party (JWP). Importantly, among these groups very few like the NP and perhaps JWP would like to negotiate on a solution of the Balochistan conundrum inside the framework of Pakistan. Still the Pakistani state seems to have no option but to negotiate and it is the only way it could develop some good feelings in the hearts of Balochs. The state has to initiate the process of dialogue irrespective of the radical demands of the political-cum-militant groups in expectation that the final solution would be somehow in the interest of Pakistan.

The third important strand of a workable Balochistan strategy would be to forthwith free all the so-called ‘missing’ Balochs. This would be an important confidence-building measure in ultimate negotiations with the estranged political and militant groups linked to the Baloch national movement.

The strategy of use of military force in Balochistan has to be revisited as it has brought nothing positive to the country. Instead it has made the conflict more complex and grave. The simple conflict which has its roots in ethnic, political and economic rights and provincial autonomy has transformed into a movement for self-determination increasingly drawing international actors into it. Another important thing for the government to do is to establish a truth and reconciliation commission, mostly comprising Baloch leaders, to determine the reasons for the conflict, to fix responsibility and to chart out the future roadmap for the solution of the conflict.