The security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, which has been deteriorating since 2022, shows no signs of improvement. In recent weeks, the violence has intensified, with terrorist incidents becoming both more frequent and more deadly. These attacks are claiming the lives of both civilians and members of the security forces.
Three recent incidents highlight the severity of the situation. On September 3, a rally of the Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) in Quetta, which was also attended by leaders of the opposition Tehreek-Tahaffuz-e-Ain-e-Pakistan (TTAP), was targeted in a terrorist attack. At least 17 workers of various political parties were killed, with BNP-M chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal believed to be the intended target.
A day earlier, on September 2, six soldiers were martyred and five terrorists killed when security forces foiled an attack on the Frontier Constabulary (FC) Headquarters in Bannu, KP. On the same day, at least six people were killed when terrorists ambushed a passenger vehicle in Kurram district, KP.
In August, a grave situation unfolded in northern Balochistan’s Zhob district, which borders KP’s Dera Ismail Khan. More than 50 militants, reportedly from the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — described by the military as an “Indian proxy” — were killed in operations. Around two dozen civilians and security personnel also lost their lives. The militants were attempting to cross the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on the night of August 7 and 8.
According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, Pakistan now ranks second among the countries most affected by terrorism, with deaths rising 45 percent compared to the previous year. Responsibility for the recent attacks has been claimed by different groups: the Quetta rally bombing by Islamic State-Khurasan (IS-K), the Bannu assault by the TTP’s Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction, while the Kurram incident remains unclaimed. However, since all six victims were Shia, it may have been carried out either by a local sectarian group or IS-K, given its history of anti-Shia violence.
These developments show that multiple terrorist groups remain active in KP and Balochistan, posing a severe threat to the people of these provinces. While Balochistan has long suffered from such violence, KP has also witnessed a surge in attacks, particularly in Bannu, Peshawar, Karak, Lakki Marwat, and Bajaur, with police personnel frequently targeted.
The attacks in Quetta, Bannu, and Kurram underline a disturbing reality: terrorist groups are regrouping and regaining strength, enabling them to strike civilians and security forces at will.
The argument put forward by the authorities—that terrorist attacks occur despite their “best arrangements,” and that without such measures the casualties would have been far greater—is unconvincing. This line of reasoning implies that terrorists are stronger than the state, and that the state has only limited capacity to contain them. Such statements risk emboldening terrorists while discouraging security personnel. The persistence of terrorist attacks is partly fueled by this defeatist rhetoric from officials. For example, after the Quetta attack, the authorities nearly admitted that preventing such incidents was beyond their capacity, and instead advised political parties to limit their democratic activities. This is a troubling suggestion: rather than acknowledging their failure, officials sought to restrict constitutionally protected political freedoms. It exposes the Balochistan government’s lack of preparedness in dealing with the escalating terrorist threat. This should be a matter of grave concern for federal authorities, particularly as the government anticipates the launch of CPEC’s second phase (CPEC-II), expected to bring billions of dollars of Chinese investment, especially in Balochistan.
In addition to the incidents already mentioned, several significant security developments have unfolded in KP and Balochistan over the past month. Chief among them is the launch of a military operation in certain areas of Bajaur district. This offensive was initiated despite resistance from the local population and the PTI-led provincial government. The military justified the move by arguing that dialogue between local notables and civil society representatives with the TTP leadership had “failed,” as the TTP refused demands to relocate to Afghanistan. According to military authorities, this is not a new comprehensive operation but a targeted effort to clear terrorist strongholds in Bajaur. The effectiveness and outcomes of this offensive remain to be seen.
There has long been strong opposition to fresh military operations in KP. Authorities themselves have refrained from launching large-scale offensives, mindful of widespread anti-operation sentiment among Pakhtuns. This opposition stems from the fact that Pakistan’s heaviest human and material losses from the war on terror—more than 100,000 deaths and over $126 billion in economic costs—have been borne disproportionately by KP and the Pakhtun-inhabited areas of Balochistan. The TTP continues to exploit these grievances, making counterterrorism offensives difficult to achieve without generating local backlash.
Given this context, the state urgently needs a revised counterterrorism strategy. A revival and strict implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP), adopted in 2015 to combat extremism and terrorism, is imperative. Moving forward, the trajectory of the Bajaur offensive will be critical to monitor, as well as the potential launch of military operations in Khyber and Waziristan districts. The outcomes of these offensives, their impact on local populations, and the response of the TTP will shape the security landscape in KP and Balochistan in the months ahead.