Redefining national interest in Pakistan

Pakistan has reached another critical juncture in its history, with looming threats to the state itself due to a low-intensity civil war in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This situation necessitates a re-evaluation of the concept of “national interest” in the country.
In a recent meeting of the National Security Committee (NSC), it was resolved that Pakistan and its integrity must take precedence over all personalities and vested interests. While this principle is sound, modern political science theories remind us that the state is an inanimate entity—it is the leaders and citizens who give it life and meaning. Therefore, if Pakistani leadership continues to justify policies and actions by relying solely on the abstract notion of national interest, the real needs of the people may remain unaddressed.
The concept of “national interest” is fundamental to both domestic and international politics, yet in Pakistan, it has often been exploited to promote the agendas of powerful groups. After 78 years of existence, this approach has failed to serve the true interests of the people, leaving society mired in conflict and crisis. Although national interest is a cornerstone of a state’s existence and the functioning of its government, successive Pakistani rulers—civilian and military alike—have largely neglected it. Paradoxically, these same governments have consistently claimed that their rise to power was driven by a commitment to safeguarding the national interest.
National interest is both a vital and elusive concept, abstract in nature and subject to varying interpretations. Ideally, it should reflect the aspirations of the majority—or at least a significant portion—of the people and groups within society. It is the responsibility of the government to observe, articulate, and pursue this interest through well-formulated policies and strategies. However, only a democratically elected and popularly supported government can genuinely discern and represent the national interest. In Pakistan’s history, most governments have failed in this regard, leaving large segments of society underdeveloped and insecure across multiple dimensions.
In practice, the national interest of many states is shaped by the most powerful groups within society. For instance, in the United States, big corporations and influential lobbies, such as Jewish advocacy groups, play a significant role in defining national priorities. In Pakistan, the security establishment and power elite have historically been the primary arbiters of national interest. When dominant groups dictate this concept, the resulting objectives rarely align with the welfare of the broader population. Instead, these groups prioritize their own organizational or institutional agendas, which cannot authentically represent the collective good. In other words, when powerful entities control the definition of national interest, they often manipulate it to serve their own ends rather than those of the majority.
Realistically, national interest is a blend of the aspirations of the majority and the priorities of influential groups. In developed, democratic nations, this balance tilts toward the interests of the people, tempered by the influence of powerful stakeholders. In contrast, in underdeveloped countries like Pakistan, national interest is predominantly shaped by elite groups, often to the exclusion of the populace.
When defining and determining national interest, it is beneficial to include the interests of both the majority of the people and the powerful groups within society. However, national interest also encompasses a critical dimension: its guiding principles. These principles primarily include national integrity, the security and stability of the state and society, the development of the state and society, and the welfare of the people. There is little disagreement that these constitute the fundamental principles and objectives of national interest. Notably, all governments—whether democratically elected or dominated by powerful groups—along with influential stakeholders, concur that these elements are the core dynamics of national interest. Government officials frequently invoke these terms when explaining national interest to the public. However, while principles are essential, it is the policies designed to pursue them that ultimately matter more.
Policies to achieve national interest must align with its foundational principles. In countries like Pakistan, however, this alignment is rarely achieved. For a political analyst, examining the compatibility between the principles and policies of national interest is crucial. For example, if security and stability are key principles, successive governments should pursue policies such as fostering improved relations with neighboring countries and major global powers to ensure internal security. Similarly, if development is a central principle, a government’s success could be measured by policies that sustain high GDP growth, boost exports, import advanced technology, or enable citizens to pursue cutting-edge education in developed nations. In Pakistan’s case, successive governments have largely failed to implement policies that promote the development of the state and its people. Instead, many have prioritized institutional, familial, or partisan interests over a national interest defined by the needs of the majority.
There are three main approaches to determining who should define national interest. The first posits that elected governments should take on this responsibility. This view has merit, as the general populace often lacks the knowledge or capacity to articulate national interest. A popularly elected government, composed of representatives of the majority, is better positioned to define and pursue it. The second approach argues that the people themselves should determine national interest. While this might be feasible in highly developed nations of North America and Western Europe, it is impractical in countries like Pakistan, where widespread illiteracy and political unawareness prevail. The third approach suggests that the intelligentsia—comprising university professors, journalists, authors, researchers, and think tank members—should define and determine national interest.
Ideally, the intelligentsia is the most qualified group to shape national interest, given its presumed expertise and analytical capacity. However, in Pakistan, the nature of this group raises concerns. Many within the intelligentsia lack the qualifications, knowledge, or intellectual rigor to effectively explain key concepts, their indicators, and their determinants. A significant portion consists of pseudo-intellectuals who have secured their positions through corrupt practices rather than merit, undermining their ability to contribute meaningfully to the discourse on national interest.