Pakistan’s history is indelibly marked by the somber mention of December 16, evoking sentiments of sorrow, regret, and anger. On this fateful date, two profoundly tragic incidents unfolded—the fall of East Pakistan in 1971 and the Army Public School tragedy in 2014. Both events, occurring on the same day, not only altered the demographic landscape but also reshaped the nation’s security apparatus. Despite these transformative upheavals, the persistent greed and unpatriotic policies of the ruling elite remain unchanged.

Regrettably, Pakistani leaders have failed to glean essential lessons from these tragedies. The root causes that contributed to these lamentable events persist, particularly in regions like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Factors such as poverty, extremism, illiteracy, political and economic instability, social unrest, a precarious law and order situation, a pervasive sense of deprivation, hopelessness, and terrorism are once again playing pivotal roles, steering the nation perilously towards failure.

The failure of Pakistan as a nation-state in 1971 and the subsequent proliferation of terrorism after the Afghan war and 9/11 should serve as a stark reminder for the state to reassess its policies. Alas, the ruling elite remains criminally indifferent to these pressing issues. The tragic civil strife in East Pakistan, culminating in the country’s dismemberment, witnessed widespread atrocities. Shockingly, no action has been taken against the perpetrators, and justice remains elusive. A nation that neglects justice is destined to wither away. The Hamood-ur-Rehman commission report, revealing critical insights, never saw the light of day in Pakistan, ironically leaked and published in India.

The dismemberment of the country in 1971 was a consequence of criminal neglect by the leadership, which disregarded ground realities, failed to alleviate the sufferings of East Pakistan’s people, trampled on constitutional and democratic rights, struggled with economic disparities, and grappled with deep-seated political and cultural differences while implementing a flawed security policy.

Similarly, the tragic killing of 144 schoolchildren and teachers at the Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014 underscored the failure of the state’s foreign and security policy. The dichotomy of “good Taliban and bad Taliban” proved counterproductive, as non-state actors continued to wreak havoc with impunity.

As the year draws to a close, terrorism has surged once again in the country, reminiscent of the situation a decade ago in 2013. Recent attacks, such as the Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan’s assault on a military post in Daraban near Dera Ismail Khan, resulting in the loss of 23 lives, further highlight the escalating threat. The TJP, claiming responsibility for multiple attacks, primarily targets Pakistan’s security forces, conveying a message that it is solely engaged in a conflict against Pakistan rather than participating in global jihad—an approach reminiscent of the Afghan Taliban’s strategy against NATO forces.

Muhammad Amir Rana, a prominent security analyst, has shed light on the emergence of the Tehreek-i-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) earlier this year, led by Abdullah Yaghistani. However, questions persist regarding its true nature, with some speculating it could be a cover name used by a dissatisfied Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander from Dera Ismail Khan. Another group, Ansarul Jihad, recently claimed responsibility for an attack on security forces, further fueling speculation about the TTP’s potential use of alternative names to divert pressure from the Afghan Taliban. Regardless of their independent existence, entities like TJP and Ansarul Jihad likely operate within the TTP’s sphere, benefiting from collaboration and support from the Taliban.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, Dera Ismail Khan and its surrounding areas in Pakistan have witnessed a notable surge in terrorist activity. Particularly alarming is the sharp increase in attacks on Dera Ismail Khan itself, with 63 incidents recorded since August 15, 2021, resulting in 125 deaths, predominantly among security forces. This contrasts starkly with the previous year, which saw only four low-intensity attacks with four fatalities in the district. The trend extends beyond Dera Ismail Khan, affecting neighboring districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, including Zhob, Sherani, Bannu, Tank, and North Waziristan, where over 70 attacks have been reported to date.

The region is also grappling with attacks on phone towers, disrupting communication and fostering resentment against state institutions. The TJP, in revealing the names of terrorists after an attack on a military base, underscores the local presence within terrorist groups, backed by logistical and operational support from the Taliban across the border.

It is imperative for the state to recognize that terrorist groups, including the TTP, are concentrating their efforts in the most marginalized areas of Pakistan. The presence of an extensive network of madrasahs and related religious institutions in these marginalized areas is a proven fact, influencing the political and ideological perspectives of the local populace. There exists a high probability that the TTP and other terrorist groups garner local support from these radicalized segments of society.

Drawing lessons from the tragic events of December 16, Pakistan urgently requires a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. This policy should be crafted after a thorough review of existing strategies and an understanding of ground realities. While it is hoped that this new wave of terrorism will not achieve its nefarious goals, the looming general elections in February may face disruption due to the escalating terror attacks, particularly in Balochistan and KP.