Former federal minister and a key figure within the ruling coalition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Rana Sanaullah, has recently disclosed that following the successful passage of the 27th Constitutional Amendment, the 28th Amendment is now also on the horizon and may soon be introduced in parliament. Although Sanaullah—along with other senior officials—has yet to clearly articulate the specific focus of the upcoming amendment, journalists and political analysts widely argue that it is likely to revolve around extensive administrative and financial restructuring in the country.
These potential reforms may include revisiting the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, which outlines the vertical distribution of financial resources between the federation and the provinces, as well as the horizontal distribution among the four federating units. The speculated amendment is also expected to propose the formation of new, more viable administrative units through an increase in the number of provinces. Additionally, it may aim to shift key ministries such as education, health, and population control from provincial authorities back to the Centre.
Regardless of whether the 28th Amendment is eventually tabled, debated, or passed with consensus among coalition partners, one fact remains indisputable: Pakistan urgently requires sweeping political, administrative, and fiscal reforms. Only such comprehensive transformations can address the country’s increasingly dysfunctional governance apparatus, which continues to aggravate the lived hardships of ordinary citizens while deepening complex internal conflicts and national crises.
This urgency is underscored by persistent separatist insurgencies in two critical regions—Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). In Balochistan, the insurgency is spearheaded by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its affiliated Majeed Brigade, which the state has labelled as Fitna-tul-Hindustan due to alleged external backing. In KP, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), branded by the state as Fita-ul-Khwarij, continues to destabilize the region. Beyond militancy, Pakistan faces political instability, soaring poverty, alarming inflation, capital flight, and virtually nonexistent foreign investment. Above all, social cohesion has weakened, with conflicts emerging within almost every segment of society and across its institutional structures. In such circumstances, the state must respond with unwavering resolve and a firm commitment to far-reaching reforms aimed at preserving national stability and societal unity. Yet, these reforms must not serve as mere instruments for entrenching the power of the existing elite—a historic mistake that has repeatedly contributed to today’s severe crises.
Turning to the nature and scope of the political, administrative, and financial restructuring required, it becomes evident that the task is multidimensional. Perhaps the most critical question Pakistan must confront is the choice of a governance system capable of overcoming the widespread conflict and institutional breakdown now entrenched at nearly every level of society and state. A candid assessment of Pakistan’s realities demands acknowledging that the current parliamentary system has repeatedly fallen short in addressing the country’s complex challenges. Consequently, significant voices have emerged advocating for a presidential model akin to that of the United States—a country whose stable institutions and robust separation of powers enabled it to evolve into an unparalleled economic, political, and military power over the past 125 years. By the early 20th century, the United States had already begun constructing a formidable naval force, and by World War II it had become unrivaled, a rise made possible by a century of federal stability, administratively competent states, and sustained industrial growth. In Pakistan, however, powerful political actors have historically resisted a strong presidential system, largely due to narrow personal and factional interests.
Another essential component of meaningful political and administrative restructuring is the creation of smaller, more efficient, and administratively functional provincial units. Given Pakistan’s exponential population growth and the multiplication of citizen grievances, the existing four-province structure has become increasingly inadequate. At independence in 1947, Pakistan consisted of three provinces, with Balochistan attaining full provincial status only in 1970. Since then, the demographic burden and complexity of governance have far outpaced the capacity of these provinces to deliver reliable public services. This became particularly evident after the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010, which devolved numerous subjects from the federal Concurrent List to provincial governments. The provinces have struggled to manage these expanded responsibilities, highlighting structural weaknesses in governance and policymaking.
Strengthening local government (LG) systems is another indispensable aspect of national restructuring. Although LG bodies have existed in various forms across the provinces, they have largely failed to deliver meaningful services or resolve grassroots issues due to the provinces’ reluctance to devolve real administrative, legal, and financial authority. As a result, the country now faces an administrative labyrinth—numerous departments and officials but little actual relief for the public. In this context, creating additional provinces has become increasingly necessary. Smaller, more manageable federating units would enhance provincial capacity, streamline administration, and allow local governments to finally function as intended.
However, new provinces must not be carved along purely ethnic or linguistic lines. While ethnic identity currently motivates much of the demand for new provinces, such divisions would undermine federal cohesion and administrative efficiency. True restructuring must prioritize functional governance, not identity politics. The ongoing integration of the former FATA region into KP, efforts to establish South Punjab, and the push for a definitive administrative status for Gilgit-Baltistan all represent steps in this direction, but these efforts will remain incomplete.