Terrorist and insurgent groups have unleashed a new wave of violence, with reports indicating that nearly 100 people, including many security personnel, were martyred in a span of just 10 days following November 10. A single attack on November 21 in Kurram district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, saw gunmen open fire on vehicles carrying Shiite Muslims, killing over 55 people.

The day before, on November 20, a suicide blast near the Mali Khel check post in Bannu district, KP, claimed the lives of 12 soldiers. According to a military spokesperson, security forces also killed six terrorists in the same district. On November 19, eight security personnel were martyred and three others injured in fierce gun battles with militants in Tirah Valley, Khyber district. Some media outlets reported that 12 security personnel may have been martyred. In the confrontation, nine militants were reportedly neutralized after they attacked a military camp near the Bagh-Maidan Markaz.

Earlier, on November 9, a suicide bomb explosion at a railway station in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province, killed 25 people. Dozens more were injured in the blast, which targeted a busy morning train set to depart for Peshawar, KP’s capital. The banned separatist militant group, Balochistan Liberation Army, claimed responsibility for this attack.

Aside from these major incidents, several smaller-scale attacks have occurred in KP and Balochistan. Tragically, the martyrdom of security forces, including police personnel, has become almost routine in KP. This surge in terrorist activity highlights several important aspects that require thorough analysis. Notably, all these attacks have been confined to KP and Balochistan. This suggests that terrorism in Pakistan remains largely localized within these two provinces, while other regions—including Punjab, Sindh, and the autonomous areas of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK)—have remained relatively insulated. Although GB has occasionally experienced large-scale terrorist attacks, they remain infrequent.

The majority of these attacks in KP are attributed to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the country’s largest terrorist network. Interestingly, the TTP has yet to claim responsibility for any of the attacks in KP following November 9. However, authorities and analysts believe this may be a deliberate strategy to deflect blame. This tactic is perplexing, as such attacks typically serve as propaganda tools for groups like the TTP, whose primary goal is to instill fear and gain widespread media attention. By not claiming responsibility, the TTP seems to be adopting a less conventional approach, leaving observers questioning the rationale behind this shift.

The TTP’s reluctance to claim responsibility for recent attacks appears to be a calculated move to avoid the backlash associated with these heinous acts. For any terrorist group, local support is vital. Publicly owning such attacks risks alienating the very communities whose rights and power these groups purport to champion. This raises the question: What purpose do these recent attacks serve?

It seems the primary aim is to demoralize the armed forces and push them into a defensive posture. By doing so, the terrorists hope to force state security forces to withdraw from contested territories, creating a vacuum that they can exploit. For groups like the TTP, this is a significant opportunity to assert dominance, especially in KP’s merged tribal districts (MTDs), formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This strategy is not new for the TTP. Since its inception in 2007, the group has sought to control territory. At its peak, it unofficially ruled vast swaths of FATA, from Bajaur in the north to South Waziristan in the south. During this period, the TTP was led by notorious commanders like its founder Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud. The group’s reign of terror was punctuated by the December 16, 2014, attack on a school in Peshawar, which killed around 150 people, mostly children. This horrific act prompted a massive military offensive that drove the TTP out of FATA and reestablished state authority. Consequently, the TTP relocated its operations to Afghanistan.

Since then, the group has used Afghanistan as a base of operations, particularly after the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. The TTP has enjoyed protection and support from the Afghan Taliban, who view them as ideological allies. This has enabled the group to inflict significant death and destruction in Pakistan. Despite Islamabad’s repeated protests and demands, the Afghan Taliban has shown little willingness to curb the TTP’s activities. In a recent development, Pakistan has provided China with evidence of the Afghan Taliban’s support for terrorist groups targeting Pakistan. The aim is to involve China, whose citizens and interests in Pakistan have also come under attack, in pressuring the Afghan Taliban to sever ties with these groups. While the Afghan Taliban are reportedly under growing pressure to withdraw support for the TTP, they have yet to take decisive action. Fear of retaliation from the TTP may be one reason for their hesitance. However, there are indications that the Taliban may have encouraged the TTP to relocate its command and control structures closer to the Pakistan border, particularly in tribal districts, which aligns with the recent uptick in attacks in KP’s MTDs.

Meanwhile, in Balochistan, the recent wave of violence has been claimed by Baloch ethnic-separatist groups, particularly the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its militant wing, the Majeed Brigade. The suicide attack in Quetta, which claimed numerous lives, underscores the growing radicalization of these groups. Traditionally, Baloch separatist movements have been non-religious and less extreme in their tactics, but the shift toward more radical and violent strategies is deeply concerning and marks a dangerous escalation.

This alarming situation demands a multifaceted response, including addressing the underlying socio-political grievances, strengthening counter-terrorism efforts, and fostering regional cooperation to curb cross-border militancy. Without such measures, the cycle of violence in KP and Balochistan is likely to persist.