The phenomenon of geopolitics, or the importance of territory and geography in shaping a country’s foreign policy direction and objectives, is often believed to have declined since the turn of the 21st century. However, this perception has always been misleading. Recent international developments strongly suggest that geopolitics has not only survived but has made a decisive comeback, once again becoming a central driver of global power politics.
Since February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of neighbouring Ukraine, and later with the early October 2023 surprise attacks by the Palestinian armed resistance group Hamas on Israel—followed by Tel Aviv’s massive military response that has resulted in the killing of more than seventy thousand Palestinians—international power dynamics have undergone profound and far-reaching changes. In the first case, Russia attacked Ukraine to demonstrate that it still considers itself a major power that cannot be ignored.
Moscow also sought to send a clear message that any attempt by Ukraine, once part of the Soviet Union, to move closer to the United States–led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and create a strategic threat on Russia’s western flank would be met with an iron hand. Conversely, the United States has continued to pursue NATO’s eastward expansion, attempting to draw Ukraine into its strategic orbit in order to reinforce American and allied dominance of the global order. In the case of Hamas’s attack on Israel, a non-state actor sought to undermine a state created in 1948, which has since struggled for survival and responded ferociously to the challenge.
It is important to note that since the end of the Cold War, most major powers have formally prioritised geo-economics over classical geopolitics. The rise of China, along with its model of state capitalism, further strengthened this trend. Geo-economics refers to the use of economic instruments—such as trade, investment, aid, and market access—to achieve geopolitical objectives, including influencing the behaviour and policies of other states. There is also a reverse dimension of geo-economics, whereby geopolitical tools such as diplomacy, war, and border management are employed to secure economic goals like GDP growth and improved living standards.
China appears to be the leading advocate of geo-economics. Its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to economically integrate around 60 countries across the Afro-Eurasian landmass. This geo-economic orientation has significantly enhanced China’s global influence and positioned it on a trajectory to become a central power in the international system.
In contrast, another major global actor—the Russian Federation—remains deeply rooted in traditional geopolitics. This may partly be explained by the fact that President Vladimir Putin has effectively ruled the country for more than two decades. Rather than concentrating exclusively on economic modernisation, Moscow has prioritised territorial control and strategic depth, key objectives of classical geopolitics. The continued occupation of Crimea, historically Ukrainian territory, illustrates this approach. While Russia may derive some geo-economic benefits from holding Crimea, the strategy remains overwhelmingly geostrategic in nature.
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world effectively became unipolar. In the post-Soviet era, the United States has largely dominated the global political landscape. This dominance has brought both advantages and vulnerabilities. During this period, the most significant challenge to US power did not come from rival states, but from non-state actors.
The principal non-state challenge to the US-led unipolar order emerged from militant organisations, most notably Al Qaeda, which carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks on the American mainland. In response, Washington launched the Global War on Terror against militant groups operating primarily in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and South Asia. This campaign officially came to an end after nearly two decades when the United States failed to defeat the Afghan Taliban insurgency and was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in August 2021, even before the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Years of negotiations culminated in the February 2020 agreement between the US and the Taliban, paving the way for American withdrawal.
It is noteworthy that the Afghan Taliban initially functioned as a non-state actor but managed to seize control of Afghanistan by force in September 1996, transforming itself into a state actor. More significantly, the Taliban regime provided sanctuaries and operational space to global militant groups such as Al Qaeda and various Central and South Asian terrorist organisations, whose activities eventually triggered the Global War on Terror. This demonstrates that violent non-state actors, even when transformed into state actors, pose grave risks to regional and global stability. A similar example is the Islamic State, which emerged in 2014, seized large territories in Iraq and Syria, declared a so-called “Islamic Caliphate,” and severely destabilised international peace.
Historically, armed movements have also led to state formation, such as the American Revolution, where militias under George Washington fought British rule. The key difference, however, is that earlier movements were driven by coherent intellectual frameworks. The American Revolution was shaped by Enlightenment thinkers, while the French Revolution was inspired by philosophers like Rousseau, Voltaire, and Montesquieu. Contemporary non-state militant actors, by contrast, are often ideologically incoherent, relying on violence rather than intellectual vision.
In the post–Cold War era, non-state militant organisations posed ideological and security challenges to US dominance, but not a serious financial threat due to their limited resources compared to state actors like the former Soviet Union. As a result, the United States largely succeeded in neutralising these threats.
Today, however, the global system is gradually moving toward a new Cold War–like configuration, primarily due to the rise of China as an alternative power centre. China’s economic expansion, particularly under President Xi Jinping through initiatives such as the BRI, represents a form of soft expansionism aimed at placing Beijing at the heart of Afro-Eurasian economic integration. Consequently, American global dominance is now increasingly challenged by a powerful state actor rather than non-state groups. The escalating trade rivalry between the US and China, tensions in the South China Sea, and disputes over Taiwan and Hong Kong all reflect the contours of this emerging strategic competition.
In this evolving global environment, India—aspiring to become a major power in its own right—has aligned itself more closely with the United States. China, India’s neighbour, is viewed not only as Washington’s principal strategic rival but also as a potential economic competitor. Russia, meanwhile, is carefully navigating this rivalry, avoiding firm alignment with either side and seeking to extract maximum advantage from US–China competition. Smaller states such as Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, and Turkey are also adjusting their foreign policies, aligning with one side or the other based on their economic interests, security concerns, and regional ambitions.