Despite the recent visit by Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, to Kabul, issues between Islamabad and Kabul persist. According to media reports, Dar’s visit helped somewhat ease the extremely strained relations between the two sides, but no breakthroughs were achieved on the main issues.
The two major points of contention remain: First, the continued attacks inside Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) based in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan’s decision to repatriate millions of Afghan refugees holding Proof of Registration (PoR) cards by June 30, 2025.
Regarding TTP attacks from Afghan soil, Islamabad has presented substantial evidence suggesting that the Afghan Taliban regime supports the TTP’s operations against Pakistan. During Dar’s recent visit, the Afghan Taliban reiterated their usual assurances that Afghan territory would not be used against Pakistan. However, these promises remain largely rhetorical. There have been no meaningful actions by the Afghan Taliban to curb the TTP’s activities.
Some media reports suggest internal concern within the Afghan Taliban about the TTP’s anti-Pakistan activities. While certain pro-Pakistan elements do exist within the Taliban, they remain weak and marginalized. This is despite Pakistan’s significant historical role in the Taliban’s emergence in 1994 and their capture of power in 1996.
True to the historical Afghan character of turning against benefactors, the Afghan Taliban as a whole have taken an adversarial stance against Pakistan. While earlier they appeared silent and seemingly pro-Pakistan, creating the perception among Pakistani, Afghan, and international analysts that the Taliban would act as Pakistan’s proxy once in power, this notion has now completely evaporated.
The Taliban’s overt support for the TTP and their various anti-Pakistan actions have shattered earlier Pakistani strategic assumptions. Past Pakistani policymakers must be criticized for failing to grasp the true nature of the Afghan Taliban, especially given the latter’s consistent rejection of the Pakistan-Afghanistan international border as final.
Following their return to power in August 2021, the Taliban have consistently taken steps that highlight their anti-Pakistan stance. Most notably, the regime has officially declared the international border with Pakistan “disputed” and “unacceptable” and has taken practical steps to reinforce this position.
In this context, the Afghan Taliban regime has engaged in cutting and plucking the barbed wire fences that Pakistan erected along the 2,640-kilometer-long border — a barrier built with the blood of its security forces and the hard-earned money of its taxpayers. The Afghan Taliban have also attempted to construct security checkpoints on the Pakistani side of the border.
Given these developments, it is unlikely that the Afghan Taliban regime will take any concrete steps to prevent the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) from using Afghan territory to launch attacks against Pakistan. Beyond the Afghan Taliban’s anti-Pakistan stance, there are other significant reasons why they are unlikely to sever ties with the TTP.
Firstly, the TTP has long been a critical militant ally of the Afghan Taliban. Since its formation in 2007 — and even before that, through leaders like Baitullah Mehsud — the TTP fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. As the Taliban’s rule is rooted solely in armed power without any democratic legitimacy, their hold on power depends heavily on maintaining strong militant support. In this framework, the TTP remains crucial, especially in the event of any future anti-Taliban resistance from Afghan groups.
Furthermore, both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are ethnically Pashtun. The Taliban regime views the TTP as strategic assets against non-Pashtun groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, as well as against the Islamic State-Khurasan (IS-K).
Secondly, the Afghan Taliban fear that if they alienate the TTP, it could push the group into an alliance with IS-K — a group with which the TTP shares ideological affinities as both are global jihadist movements. Such a development would pose a significant threat to the Afghan Taliban’s rule.
In this backdrop, the Taliban’s repeated assurances that Afghan soil will not be used against Pakistan are merely cosmetic. It is reassuring that Pakistan’s current strategists recognize the true designs of the Afghan Taliban. Consequently, Islamabad has adopted a tougher stance toward the Taliban regime — a necessary and appropriate policy shift.
Pakistan’s current policy to ensure the immediate return of millions of Afghan refugees, both legal and illegal, is commendable. Islamabad has already announced that all Afghan citizens must leave Pakistan by March 31, 2025. Although few Afghan citizens — identified through the Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) issued by Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) — have returned so far, many had hoped for yet another extension, as happened in the past.
However, this time Pakistan has remained firm in its decision to repatriate all Afghan nationals by the end of June this year. It is vital that Islamabad stands its ground on this policy, as the presence of millions of Afghan refugees poses a serious national security threat. The issue of expelling illegal aliens — particularly more than four million Afghans living in Pakistan — is where the state must act as a ‘hard state’ and protect its national interests uncompromisingly.